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Religious Freedom and Educational Opportunity
On August 25, 1995, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued an order
temporarily enjoining the implementation of those portions of the Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program that would allow parents to use a state supported
voucher to send their children to sectarian schools.' Petitioners argued that the
program, scheduled to begin within weeks, violated federal and state
constitutional standards for the separation of church and state. This case
represents one of the most significant constitutional conundrums in American
jurisprudence and is poised to make its way through the state and federal
judiciaries at a time when the United States Supreme Court appears to be
undertaking a thorough reexamination of the meaning of the First Amendment.
It also signals a new chapter in legal and political discourse that will continue
to unfold as school choice programs gain increasing support among governors,
state legislators, and members of Congress.
The problem posed by this case is indeed complex, requiring several levels
of analysis before a just resolution can be reached. First, there is the issue of
the First Amendment itself and the need to determine the proper balance
between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause in order to
protect individual rights from infringement by governmental authority.2 This
is a perennial question, as old as the republic.3 Yet our convoluted constitu-
tional history provides few consistent or satisfactory answers to assist us in
addressing contemporary First Amendment problems. Our Constitution is "a
living document"; its life has been rather peripatetic and somewhat unpredict-
able, especially when it comes to the First Amendment. Therefbre the lessons
of history are of limited value in addressing contemporary questions like choice
in education.
Next there is the issue of American federalism, which creates the potential
for subjecting governmental acts to several levels of judicial review, along two
distinct but connected legal corridors.4 Although state courts have sole
1. Thompson v. Jackson, No. 95-2153-OA (order granting preliminary injunction), L.C. #s
95CV1982 and 95CV1997. Similar cases are working their way through the courts in Ohio and
Vermont. On March 29, 1996, a deadlocked Supreme Court remanded to a local circuit court for trial.
With one Justice recused, three Justices thought the Choice Program violated the state establishment
clause and three Justices thought the respondents challenging the Choice Program had not proven it
invalid under either the Federal or the Wisconsin Constitutions. See Thompson v. Jackson, 546 N.W.2d
140 (Wis. 1996) (per curiam).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. For opposing viewpoints on the issue, compare Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the
FirstAmendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673 (1980), with Abner S. Greene, The
Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993).
4. On the problems of interpretation inherent in judicial federalism, see Paul W. Kahn,
Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1147 (1993); Robert F.
Utter, Sinmming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal Constitutional Issues
when Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1025 (1985); Robert F.
Williams, Methodology Problems in Enforcing State Constitutional Rights, 3 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 143
(1986-87) [hereinafter Methodology Problems].
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jurisdiction for determining whether state and local actions are permissible
under their own constitutions, they often review policies on the basis of federal
constitutional criteria. While federal courts have no jurisdiction regarding state
constitutional matters, they may strike down state and local actions as
incompatible with federal constitutional standards. In recent years the Supreme
Court has adopted a more accommodationist view of the First Amendment. A
review of the case law will show that the Rehnquist Court has shifted away
from the strict separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause practiced
by its two predecessors and has moved towards a more generous reading of the
free exercise provision.5 This shift has not been followed consistently by the
state courts. As a result, many provisions of state law requiring strict
separation are misaligned with emergent federal constitutional standards.
Finally, there is the more immediate policy issue. Under what conditions
should state aid be permitted to support sectarian education? I do not mean to
suggest here that the answer to this question should be determined by extra-
legal criteria. I would propose, however, that its resolution cannot be reached
solely on the basis of a First Amendment analysis. The matter is more
complicated and requires an analysis of constitutional provisions other than the
Religion Clauses. Our constitutional history has taught us that the most
profound educational questions that come before the courts turn on the
Fourteenth Amendment.6 School choice is both a liberty issue and an equality
issue. In order to strike the proper balance between disestablishment and free
exercise rights in the context of education, we must factor equal protection
considerations into the analysis.
Based on the child benefit theory adopted by the Supreme Court in several
major cases,7 I will argue that tuition assistance provided to parents who
choose to send their children to schools with religious affiliations is permissible
under the United States Constitution.' Furthermore, I contend, to explicitly
5. For comment on this historical shift, see Stephen L. Carter, The Resurrection of Religious
Freedom?, 107 HARv. L. REv. 118 (1993) [hereinafter The Resurrection of Religious Freedom]; Carl
H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme Court's Law of Religious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict, or
Chaos?, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 581 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Participation in
Public Programs: Religious Freedom at the Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115 (1992) [hereinafter
McConnell, Religious Freedom].
6. The Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant, part that: "No State shall... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For a historical
analysis of how the Fourteenth Amendment has been applied in several areas of education, see
ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW: LEGAL RIGHTS AND FEDERAL POLICY IN
THE POST-BROWN ERA (1986) [hereinafter EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW].
7. The "child benefit" theory was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Cochran v. Louisiana
State Board ofEduc., 281 U.S. 370 (1930); and later in Everson v. Board ofEduc., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
It was subsequently adopted in a series of more recent cases beginning with Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388 (1983). See also Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Zobrest
v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. I (1993).
8. See Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools-An Update, 75
CAL. L. REv. 5, 13 (1987) (arguing that Witters decision provides constitutional basis for justifying
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exclude religious schools from choice options infringes upon the religious
liberty and educational opportunity of those who would make such a choice.
In particular, such exclusion places an unfair burden on poor parents who
desire to incorporate religious values into the education of their children or
who seek to improve their educational opportunities beyond those available in
public schools. Part I traces the history of First Amendment jurisprudence and
relates it to three philosophical traditions: liberalism, republicanism, and
pluralism. It describes a gradual movement of the modem Court from a liberal
orientation to a more pluralistic one, shifting the balance of constitutional
interpretation from the Establishment Clause to the Free Exercise Clause. Part
II fbcuses on state constitutional law. It explains the diverse approaches to
separation among the states and the incidence of disharmony between state and
federal standards as posing a serious threat to religious freedom as it is
presently understood by the Court. Part III examines the philosophical and
legal connection between First Amendment jurisprudence and the egalitarian
principles set down in Brown v. Board of Education.9 It explains the salience
of school choice-as presently formulated in the policy arena-in the context
of both educational opportunity and religious freedom. The final section of the
Article concludes that the pluralist perspective recently adopted by the Supreme
Court in interpreting the First Amendment serves to enhance both educational
opportunity and religious freedom. It urges, however, that under our system
of constitutional federalism, the standards adopted must be enforced among the
states in order to ensure that these protections are not undermined.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: BALANCING DISESTABLISHMENT AND FREE
EXERCISE
A. The Futile Search for Intent
What did the Framers have in mind when they drafted the First Amend-
ment? The question has occupied constitutional scholars fbr two centuries. Not
only does it remain unresolved, but even to the extent that we can determine
the Framers' motivations, we find that the context in which they operated was
far different from that of the twentieth or twenty-first century. 10 Their
understanding of an established religion was remote from anything we know
in contemporary American society. Since education was not viewed as a federal
responsibility, the Founders gave scant attention to the constitutional
school vouchers).
9. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 484 (1954).
10. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204
(1980); Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1033 (1981) (discussing
general problems of interpreting intent to resolve contemporary constitutional issues).
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implications of schooling. And insofar as they contemplated the role of
education in a free society, separating its content from organized religion was
not a concern.
1. Church and State Prior to the First Amendment
In eighteenth-century Europe, establishment referred to the existence of an
officially approved church supported by public funds, where ecclesiastic and
state authority were intermingled. Establishment was exclusionary in the sense
that membership in the official church was required to hold public office and
to qualify for other social privileges, and discrimination against other faiths
was not unusual. Owing to the distinct origin of each settlement, religious
establishment was more ambiguous and diverse in colonial America."
Prior to independence, the colonies developed several forms of establish-
ment relationships. These ranged from a rigid emulation of the English
model, 12 through local option and multiple establishment schemes,'" to more
contemporary positions forbidding any establishment.14 The various compro-
mises reached were a product of each colony's unique historical circumstances.
11. For a historical analysis of religious establishment in colonial America, see THOMAS J. CURRY,
THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
105-33 (1986); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1421-30 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, The Origins of Free
xercise].
12. In Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas, the established church was supported by public
monies and actually functioned as an instrument of governmental control. Office holding was confined
to Anglicans, and non-believers were commonly banished. Georgia also recognized the Church of
England as its established religion, but, unlike other southern colonies, excepting its exclusion of
Catholics, the state displayed a certain tolerance towards other Protestant sects and even Jews.
13. In New England, with its strong predisposition towards localism, each town would choose its
own minister and enact taxes to support its church. Although the decentralized democratic structure of
government in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire allowed communities to escape political
domination by the Anglican church, the system resulted in another form of favoritism. Because the
populations of the towns were dominated by Congregationalists, there was little tolerance even for other
Protestants. Baptists, Presbyterians, and Quakers were especially singled out for ill-treatment.
New York had a unique form of establishment among the colonies. When the English conquered
New Amsterdam in 1664, the Dutch Reformed Church was already recognized as the official creed.
That same year, the "Duke's Laws" disestablished the Dutch church. In its place the English
government set up a multiple establishment, requiring each town to choose a Protestant church and
minister that it would support with public taxes. Because the population of New York was so diverse,
the outcome of local decision making was more pluralistic than in New England. Thus, New Yorkers,
at least those who were not Catholics or Jews, enjoyed a considerable degree of religious freedom. For
a discussion of New York's unique form of multiple establishment, see LEONARD W. LEvY, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 11-16 (2d ed. 1994)
14. Four colonies had no form of religious establishment at all: Rhode Island, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, and New Jersey. In New Jersey religious establishment would have been impractical because
of the colony's diverse population. The other colonies had been specifically set up for people who had
sought to escape religious persecution in other places. Roger Williams founded Rhode Island as a safe
haven for religious dissenters from Massachusetts, and William Penn established Delaware and
Pennsylvania for the Quakers. Given their origins, neither an official church nor intolerance fit well
within the philosophical dispositions of the former three colonies.
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Separation from the Crown brought a strong reaction against the Anglican
Church in those states where it enjoyed a privileged position as the official
religion. For these former colonies disestablishment was a feature of political
independence." With some modification the local option system continued to
prevail in New England after the war,16 while the states that had maintained
a more pronounced separation between church and state as colonies did not find
a need to alter the relationship significantly after independence.' 7 New York
continued to abide by its principle of multiple establishment. Nevertheless, its
legislature saw fit to enact a statute to remind Anglicans that they did not enjoy
preferential status.'8
By the time the Framers sat down to begin drafting a Bill of Rights, a clear
pattern of religious toleration had begun to appear. The common element of
disestablishment found among the former colonies was a decided aversion to
setting up a single official church at the state level; and this instinct, pursued
most aggressively against the Anglican Church, was, at least in part, inspired
by revolutionary sentiment against the British. Public support for organized
religion was common, with a majority of the states abiding by some form of
locally determined or individualized system of choice.
By 1789 every state except Connecticut had a constitutional provision
protecting religious freedom.' 9 But these freedoms would be found disappoint-
ing by contemporary civil rights activists. Six of the state constitutions limited
these rights to theists.20 All but two states continued to give religious tests for
those who sought public office, in effect disqualifying those who were not
Christian.2' In some cases membership in a Christian church was attached to
the franchise, and a person could be criminally prosecuted for not properly
observing the sabbath. Education, to the extent it was provided, was
15. Every one of the five southern states broke the monopoly held by the Church of England. North
Carolina was the first among them to completely end public support for religion. The others-Virginia,
Maryland, South Carolina, and Georgia-adopted a policy of nonpreferential aid that taxed people to
support the church of their choice. See LEvY, supra note 13, at 52-53.
16. In Massachusetts, while Congregationalists still dominated the scene, they would now share tax
monies with Baptists, Quakers, Episcopalians, Methodists, and Unitarians. New Hampshire permitted
its towns either to select a church to support with local taxes, or to select a church at all. By the time
Vermont became the fourteenth state to join the Union in 1791, it had already adopted the system of
local discretion that was customary in the region. Although all individuals in Vermont were expected
to choose a church they would attend and support, no person would be forced to support an official
church if they preferred to worship elsewhere. Connecticut, with its strong Congregationalist tradition,
was the only New England state to retain a preferred establishment after the war, thus relegating the
system of choice to an abstract fiction for town members who were religious minorities. See LEVY,
supra note 13, at 31-51.
17. CuRRY, supra note 11, at 159-61.
18. Id. at 161-62.
19. See McConnell, The Origins of Free Exercise, supra note 11, at 1455.
20. Id. at 1499.
21. LEvY, supra note 13, at 77.
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inseparable from religious instruction.22 Religion was an important component
of political and social life in the new republic.23 The Anglican establishment
had been expelled by the revolution, but civil authority still could be brought
to bear against someone who violated the religious mores of the community.
2. Philosophical Foundations: Liberalism, Republicanism, Pluralism
In 1789 the First Congress of the United States, responding to the appeals
made by some of the states during the ratification process, drafted a Bill of
Rights to limit the powers of the federal government. The urge to define
explicit individual rights was motivated by a deep-seated suspicion of strong
government, especially at the national level. Mediating the relationship between
government and the individual was no easy task when it came to the issue of
church and state. American attitudes throughout the states were somewhat
ambivalent, given our colonial history. And there was no certain agreement
among the Framers how to balance the requirements of the Establishment
Clause with the aspirations of the Free Exercise Clause. Was the separation
between church and state to be more rigidly defined at the national level than
it had been in the states? If so, would that compromise or enhance religious
freedom? Was there a real tension between the two First Amendment clauses,
or were they complementary expressions of the same constitutional ideal?
The debate rages on as to what we mean by an established religion. Strict
separationists will argue that an impenetrable wall of separation is needed to
protect government and religion from each other.24 At least with regard to the
question of original intent, that position is not entirely supported by the
historical record. We have already noted the intimate relationship that existed
between religion and government during the eighteenth century, and that
"multiple establishments" were indeed common. Soon after it began drafting
a Bill of Rights, the same Congress enacted legislation that established a
national day of public thanksgiving and prayer and set up a system of publicly
22. See BERNARD BALYN, EDUCATION IN THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY (1960) (tracing
connection between religious instruction and public schooling in colonial America); RICHARD J. GABEL,
PUBLIC FUNDS FOR CHURCH AND PRIVATE ScHooLs (1937) (tracing public aid to religious schools from
early years of statehood through end of Civil War).
23. For a historical overview of the important role that religion played in 18th century America,
see PATRICIA U. BONOMI, UNDER THE COPE OF HEAVEN: RELIGION, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS IN
COLONIAL AMERICA (1986); PAUL G. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1964); ELLIS
SANDOZ, A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS: POLITICAL THEORY, RELIGION, AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING
(1990); see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 55-71 (1996). For an opposing view, see ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE
GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS (1996) (arguing that
Constitution was written on separationist principles).
24. See, e.g., LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM (1967). See also MARK D. HOWE,
THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY (1965) (drawing distinction between theological and political rationales behind First Amend-
ment).
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supported chaplains for the military and both houses of Congress.25 The First
Congress had also reenacted the Northwest Ordinance which provided for a
system of schools, declaring: "Religion, morality and knowledge being
necessary to good government... schools and the means of education shall
forever be encouraged."26 Contemporary scholars point to these early
experiences in order to argue that the Constitution was never intended to erect
a strict wall of separation or prohibit government support to religion, so long
as support was not limited to one established church. 27
Determining the level of protection provided by the Free Exercise Clause
can be equally confounding. Does religious freedom under the Constitution
encompass freedom of conscience, freedom of worship, or freedom of action?
What if the requirements of one's faith impose responsibilities that undermine
one's obligations to the state? Which should take precedence? Certainly the
conventions of the early republic do not lead to a generous interpretation of
religious rights in responding to such queries, but the record is uneven. The
fact is that there was substantial disagreement among the Framers. Investigating
the historical record will never provide us with clear resolutions to our present
constitutional dilemmas. It can, nevertheless, help us to identify several strands
of thought that undergird our constitutional structure, and thus, to develop a
philosophically consistent approach to current issues.28
a. Liberalism. No document has been cited with more regularity as a brief
for religious liberty than Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Religious Free-
dom." 29 Presented to the Virginia General Assembly in 1777 as an attempt to
25. In deference to the desire for disestablishment at the time, Congress imposed a diversity
standard for the chaplain system that required a multi-sectarian arrangement for the army and allowed
the chaplains for the respective houses of Congress to be of different faiths. For a more general
discussion of Congress's financing of religious activities during the early history of the republic, see
Robert L. Cord, Church-State Separation: Restoring the "No Preference" Doctrine of the First
Amendment, 9 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 129, 139-48 (1986).
26. Quoted in CURRY, supra note 11, at 218.
27. See, e.g., CHESTER J. ANTIEAU ET AL., FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT:
FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES (1964); DANIEL L.
DREISBACH, REAL THREAT AND MERE SHADow: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1987) [hereinafter, REAL THREAT AND MERE SHADOW]; ANSON P. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN
THE UNITED STATES (1950). For a critical review of the "nonpreferentialist" position, see LEvY, supra
note 13, at 112-45; Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original
Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 875 (1986).
28. For a general overview of the intellectual currents supporting these traditions, see MICHAEL
LIENESCH, NEW ORDER OF THE AGES: TIME, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1988); Donald S. Lutz, The Intellectual Background to the American
Founding, 21 TEX. TECH L. REv. 2327 (1990).
29. No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or
ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or
goods, or shall otherwise suffer, on account of his religious opinions or belief; but... all men
shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion,
and . . . the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.
Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779), in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON
946, 947 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943).
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revise the state's laws, the bill is often cited as evidence of Jefferson's
philosophical orientation, and a clue to discovering the Framers' original
intent.30 It reveals a strong determination to promote government separation
from religion. Jefferson made an equally compelling argument for separation
in a celebrated letter written in 1802 to the Danbury Baptist Association, when
as President he refused to declare a national day of fasting and thanksgiving.3'
The documents, taken together, are of interest fbr a number of reasons. While
both ring out as appeals fbr religious rights, they also hint at the limits of those
rights and set the balance between church and state solidly on the side of the
latter. The state envisioned by Jefferson would protect religious beliefs,
opinions, professions, and arguments, but individual conduct would be subject
to the regulation of the legislature. 2
Jefferson's thinking was profoundly influenced by John Locke.33 Locke
was an ardent proponent of religious toleration in England.' In an Augustini-
an framework (albeit leading to a very different conclusion) the essence of
Locke's approach to religion was a deep appreciation of two contending
universes, a City of God and a City of Man, each entitled to their due.3" In
one world, individuals were motivated by conscience and a belief system that
30. Analyzing a series of five bills that Jefferson subsequently drafted for the Virginia legislature,
Daniel Dreisbach contends that Jefferson embraced a more accommodationist view than is indicated in
his "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom." See Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and Bills
Number 82-86 of the Revision of the Laws of Virginia, 1776-1786: New Light on the Jeffersonian Model
of Church-State Relations, 69 N.C. L. REv. 159 (1990) [hereinafter, Thomas Jefferson].
31. Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God,
that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of
government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with solemn reverence that
act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should 'make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building
a wall of separation between church and State.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and Stephen S. Nelson, A
Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, in the State of Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802), in THE
COMPLETE JEFFERSON 518, 518-19 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943).
32. See supra notes 28-30. Modem critics of this liberal strain in American political thought have
argued that the Establishment Clause can tolerate only those religions not hostile to liberalism. They
suggest that the liberal state undermines those faiths that do not subscribe to a liberal orientation toward
rights and obligations. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Political Liberalism and Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 963, 974 (1993) (drawing on work of John Rawls and
concluding, "While the government can maintain a position of neutrality among liberal religions,
liberalism itself necessitates that the government must disfavor and discriminate against illiberal
religions"). Defining which religions constitute illiberal ones is left to the state to determine. Such
discrimination against believers can extend even to areas such as education; religious parents can be
forced to educate their children in liberal precepts. See id. at 976-78; see also Steven Macedo, The
Politics of Justification, 18 POL. TH. 280 (1990).
33. See WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
18-24 (1976); J.R. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 59-86 (1978); Sanford
Kessler, Locke's Influence on Thomas Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom," 25 J.
CHURCH & ST. 231 (1983).
34. For an analysis of Locke's liberalism and his approach to religious freedom, see The Origins
of Free Exercise, supra note 11, at 1430-36.
35. SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD (Marcus Dods ed., Hafner Pub. Co. 1948) (1872).
Religious Freedom and Educational Opportunity
was the consequence of divine inspiration; in the other, norms for behavior
were established through the rational application of human intelligence in the
governmental process. Owing to the diversity of faiths existing in a free
society, conscience could potentially be a divisive force, if not for the capacity
of governmental institutions to impose a civil order. Locke's liberalism entitled
individuals to freedom of thought and conscience, but government would set
the boundaries of permissible action.36
Jefferson's liberalism, which became a major influence in American
constitutional thought, was more separationist and limiting than Locke's. 3 7
Locke supported the idea of one established church, financed by public taxes;
Jefferson opposed any form of establishment, singular or multiple. Jefferson
insisted on a public domain that was decidedly secular. The citizen might be
a devout churchgoer in private life but was expected to leave those beliefs at
the door when entering the councils of government. Indeed, it was the
requirement that religious conviction be separated from political deliberation
that made liberal democracy possible for Jefferson.3" Whether one could
forsake deep-seated convictions informed by conscience when considering
important political and moral issues is a question that will be considered in a
later part.
b. Republicanism. As Benjamin Barber has observed, one of the primary
inclinations of "liberal democracy" is "to keep men safely apart rather than to
bring them fruitfully together."" As a result it is better equipped to protect
individual rights and interests than to foster citizenship and community.
Complementary to and competing with liberalism at the time of the Founders
was the tradition of republicanism, which today remains an influential
interpretation of the post-revolutionary period.'0 While liberalism assumes that
36. McConnell explains:
For Locke, the field left to untrammeled conscience could only extend to that in which the
civil magistrate had no particular interest-principally, to things pertaining to the world to
come. Religious liberty could only be defined negatively; any broader definition would be
pointless, since the magistrate would be judge of his own powers.
The Origins of Free Exercise, supra note 11, at 1444.
37. For an exposition of the liberal position explained in the context of contemporary constitutional
law, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 195 (1992). For
a more general treatment, see also Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955).
38. As scholar Walter Berns has argued, Jefferson sought to found the American regime on a non-
religious basis; indeed, Jefferson thought that a new basis of religious toleration could not arise until
the people were convinced of the falsity of religion. See Walter Bems, Religion and the Founding
Principle, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 204, 221-22 (Robert H. Horwitz
ed., 3d ed. 1986).
39. BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 4
(1984).
40. For a survey of the present debate over the meaning and value of republicanism, see
Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). Cf. Lance Banning, The
Practicable Sphere of a Republic: James Madison, the Constitutional Convention and the Emergence of
Revolutionary Federalism, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY (Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein & Edward C. Carter 11 eds. 1987);
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personal interests are contentious and irreconcilable with one another,
republicanism is constructed on the idea of civic virtue.4' A public spirited-
ness brings citizens together in a common pursuit of the general good, and
participation in the collective experience does not diminish the individual but
fulfills her.42 Republicanism exerted an important influence in the thinking
behind the First Amendment.4" With its emphasis on civic virtue, republican-
ism is generally more sympathetic to religious organization and activity than
is liberalism, at least liberalism as conceived in Jeffersonian terms. Although
most republicans did not support the idea of an established religion, the church
was perceived as a fundamental community institution through which morality
could be implanted and engendered." Religion was not feared as a force that
would undermine effective government. To the contrary, republicans believed
that within the structure of the ecclesiastical congregation, members would
develop an appreciation for values such as self-restraint, participation,
deliberation, and consensus. As George Washington chided in his farewell
address,45 religion should be supported and encouraged, for in the end it is
good for civic society. Some modem scholars have voiced similar themes and
have advocated support for religious institutions because of their ability to
strengthen republican institutions.46
c. Pluralism. It would take the keen mind of James Madison to derive from
liberalism and republicanism the essential ingredients needed to develop an
approach to religion compatible with the principles of governance found within
the original Constitution. Like Jefferson, Madison strongly opposed a religious
JOHN PATRICK DIGGINs, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS: VIRTUE, SELF-INTEREST, AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM (1984) (offering more critical interpretations of liberalism); THOMAS L.
PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM: THE MORAL VISION OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS
AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE (1988).
41. See Timothy L. Hall, Religion and Civic Virtue: A Justification of Free Exercise, 67 TUL. L.
REV. 87 (1992). The idea of civic virtue was and is a complex one. The republican vocabulary of civic
virtue drew heavily from republican Rome and provided a set of aspirational virtues to the newly
independent colonies that would distinguish the free citizens of America from the tyrants and peasants
of the Old World: self-discipline, simplicity, and patience, for example. See J. David Hoeveler, Jr.,
Original Intent and the Politics of Republicanism, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 863, 870-71 (1992).
42. The republican tradition in Western political thought is generally traced to the work of
Macchiavelli. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975).
43. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-21 (2d ed. 1991); MARK TUSHNET,
RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 4-14 (1988); Michael W.
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1985).
44. See BERNARD BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967)
(elaborating on influence of republican ideals in crafting of Constitution); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 46-124 (1969).
45. Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality
are indispensable supports.. . . Whatever may be conceded to the influence of fine education
on minds of peculiar stature, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national
morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.
George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796).
46. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1157-62 (1991)
(arguing that state establishment would further participation and community spirit).
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establishment. This was most evident in his famous "Detached Memoranda,"
where he warned that the "danger of silent accumulations and encroachments
by Ecclesiastical Bodies have not sufficiently engaged attention in the U.S."47
The document,48 which he wrote in 1817 after leaving the presidency, was
critical of national practices that set up the chaplain systems and the celebration
of Thanksgiving.49
Nevertheless, Madison proved to be more accommodating to religion than
Jefferson. He recognized the potential conflict a religious person might have
in owing allegiance to both a divine sovereign and a worldly sovereign and
came out decisively on the side of the individual religious conscience. His
distinct perspective is clear in his "Memorial and Remonstrance":
Before any man can be considered a member of Civil Society, he must be
considered as a subject of the Governor of the Universe: And if a member of Civil
Society, who enters into any subordinate Association, must always do it with a
reservation of his duty to the general authority; much more must every man who
becomes a member of any particular Civil Society, do it with a saving of his
allegiance to the Universal Sovereign."0
Madison's pluralist synthesis of republican and liberal ideals was essential
to understanding not only the relationship between church and state in the new
republic, but also the political theory of the government itself.5t Republicans
believed that political association could serve to bring out the best virtues of
mankind and saw religious organization as a foundation for government;
liberals feared the divisive influence that religion could have on society and
looked towards government to counteract the worst instincts of men. Madison
viewed religion as a positive political and social force. More importantly,
Madison understood that the law must refrain from interfering with the
individual's conscience or religious self-understanding. Moderating the
47. JAMES MADISON, DETACHED MEMORANDA (1817).
48. Is the appointment of Chaplains to the two houses of Congress consistent with the
Constitution, and the pure principle of religious freedom?... The law appointing Chaplains
establishes a religious worship for the national representatives, to be performed by Ministers
of religion, elected by a majority of them; and these are to be paid out of the national taxes.
• . .Religious proclamations by the Executive recommending thanksgivings and fasts are
shoots from the same root. .. They seem to imply and certainly nourish the erroneous idea
of a national religion.
Id.
49. Dreisbach has pointed out that as President, Madison actually re-established the practice,
interrupted by Jefferson, of issuing thanksgiving proclamations. See Dreisbach, supra note 30, at 198.
Madison had supported a similar practice when he was a member of the Virginia General Assembly,
as well as a bill that would punish Sabbath breakers. See id. at 201.
50. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785)
reprinted in THE COMPLETE MADISON 300 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953).
51. See McConnell, The Origins of Free Exercise, supra note 11, at 1479-80, 1513-17; see also,
Christopher L. Eisgrnber, Madison's Wager: Religious Liberty in the Constitutional Order, 89 Nw. U.
L. REv. 347, 377-86 (1995).
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republican, instrumental defense of religious liberty, Madison understood the
individual's relationship with God as an "inner forum" where the state may not
enter for any reason. 2
While wary of the threat that factions could pose to the young nation, he
understood how the growth of religious sects in number and diversity could
function as a check on their power. 3 The more numerous and diverse
ecclesiastical sects were, the more difficult it would be for a single majority to
dominate and establish itself as the official church. Religious groups were
among the most important political factions in eighteenth-century America. As
Madison explained in The Federalist, Number 52, the nourishment and growth
of such factions was one of the most important defenses against tyranny.'
3. Summary
There are very few clear lessons that can be drawn from our early
constitutional history explaining the intent or the meaning of the First
Amendment, other than that the Framers were determined to protect against the
establishment of an official government-supported church, either singular or
multiple in form. There seems to have been a strong consensus around the
general principle of government neutrality,55 but whether that meant complete
separation or accommodation is more ambiguous. Since it was not expected
that the federal government would play a role in schooling, any conclusions
about original intent in this sphere are at best implicit and speculative. Among
modem American philosophers of education, such as the influential thinker
John Dewey, however, acceptance of the Jeffersonian model was wide-
spread.56 Certainly liberalism, republicanism, and pluralism all influenced the
52. See Jonathan Mills, Strict Separationisms' Sacred Canopy, 39 AM. J. JuRIs. 397, 425 (1994)
(stating that Justice Black's theory of establishment derives from Madisonian understanding); see also
MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, ThE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 32-35 (1987).
53. Madison's classic statement of the problem appears in The Federalist Number 10: "Among the
numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately
developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction." THE FEDERALIST, No. 10,
at 77 (James Madison) (New American Library ed., 1961). See also DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL
THEORY OF THE FEDERALuST 59-110 (1984); Peter S. Onuf, James Madison's Extended Republic, 21
TEX. TECH. L. REv. 2375 (1990) (discussing Madison's solution to problems of faction).
54. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious
rights. It consists in one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other the multiplicity
of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and
sects ....
THE FEDERALIST, No. 52, at 324 (James Madison) (New American Library ed., 1961).
55. On the neutrality principle, see Philip Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court,
29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961).
56. Dewey sought to replace religious values with ethical principles drawn from a "scientific"
methodology that was meant to inculcate loyalty in a secular democracy. See infra Subsection Ill.C. 1.b.
(discussing Dewey's secularism).
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authorship of the Bill of Rights. Yet even the key proponents of those
philosophical traditions were not consistent in their thinking over time5 7
No one, however, integrated the various approaches better than Madison.
He was at once sensitive to the disestablishmentarian precepts of the republic,
as well as accommodating to religiously motivated behavior. His pluralism not
only defines the basic structure of American government, it also has come to
play an increasingly important role in constitutional interpretation by the
federal courts in matters of church and state. Madison's thinking is particularly
informative today in responding to the demands of an increasingly diverse
society where different populations hold different values and expectations
regarding the education of their children.
B. Judicial Interpretations
1. Early Cases
By the middle of the twentieth century, a First Amendment jurisprudence
began to emerge that would, at least temporarily, provide some definition to
the appropriate relationship between church and state and its bearing on
education. The approach was more accommodationist than separationist." It
set down principles of parental rights and aid to students in parochial schools
that are relevant to contemporary debates on school choice. The approach also
introduced Fourteenth Amendment analysis as a relevant consideration in
education cases.
a. Parental Right to Choose. Pierce v. Society of Sisters"9 occupies a
special place in determining the legal rights of parents to choose an education
for their children. The case originated from a state compulsory education law
requiring children to attend public school. It was challenged by the Society of
Sisters, who ran a parochial school, and the directors of the Hill Military
Academy, a nonsectarian school. As Mark Tushnet explains, the statute in
question had grown out of a nativist hostility toward Catholics and was an
attempt to eliminate the parochial school system in Oregon.' A unanimous
57. Even Jefferson, as President, authorized funds for the construction of a church and the support
of a Roman Catholic priest on a mission to the Kaskaskia Indians. See Robert L. Cord, Founding
Intentions and the Establishment Clause: Harmonizing Accommodation and Separation, 10 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 47, 50 (1987) (arguing for narrower interpretation of religion clauses as more consistent
with their constitutional history).
58. A notable exception was the Reynolds case where the Supreme Court upheld a state law
outlawing polygamy that was under challenge by the Mormons. Chief Justice Waite wrote: "To permit
this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in
effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
167 (1879).
59. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
60. Mark Tushnet, Public and Private Education: Is There a Constitutional Dfference? U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 43 (1991); see also LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NoN-PUBIC SCHOOL, 1825-
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Supreme Court held that a state cannot "standardize its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public school teachers only."6 To do so
would unreasonably interfere with the rights of parents to control the
upbringing of their children and deprive private school operators of their
property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Responding to the liberty
claims of parents, the Court further explained: "The child is not the mere
creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations."62
It is interesting that the Court focused its analysis on the Fourteenth rather
than the First Amendment, emphasizing liberty and due process principles
rather than free exercise rights.' How far might these claims be taken in a
system of compulsory education? When states require children to attend school,
they support that requirement by making a free public education available. If
parents choose to exercise their rights to send their child to a parochial school,
does that relieve the state from its financial obligation? In a subsequent series
of cases the Court, in deference to Establishment Clause requirements, drew
a clear distinction between public assistance made available to children or
parents and aid provided directly to the parochial schools themselves.
b. Child Benefit Theory. In 1930 the Supreme Court in Cochran v. Board
of Education6' upheld a Louisiana law that set aside tax funds to supply text
books to children in public, private, and parochial schools. At the time the
courts had not yet determined that the First Amendment applied to the states
through incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment.' Therefore petitioners
who challenged the state practice did not use First Amendment reasoning, but
contended that the taxation was a taking of private property for public purposes
without the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
disagreed:
The appropriations were made for the specific purpose of purchasing school books
for the use of the school children of the state, free of cost to them. It was for their
benefit and the resulting benefit to the state that the appropriations were made.
True, these children attend some school, public or private, the latter sectarian or
non-sectarian, and that the books are to be furnished them for their use, free of
1925, at 205-15 (explaining role of Masons and Ku Klux Klan in Oregon School Law of 1922) (1987);
David B. Tyack, The Perils of Pluralism: The Background of the Pierce Case, 74 Am. HIST. REV. 74
(1968) (describing fundamentalists' targeting of public schools for "100 percent Americanism").
61. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
62. Id.
63. Two years earlier the Supreme Court had applied the 14th Amendment to uphold the right of
parents to maintain control over the education of their children. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
64. Cochran v. Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
65. This was not determined until ten years later in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
See infra, Subsection II.A. I.
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cost, whichever they attend. The schools, however, are not the beneficiaries of
these appropriations ... The school children and the state alone are the
beneficiaries.'
The Court seemed to grant that education is indeed a legitimate public purpose,
and one that could be fulfilled either through public, private or parochial
institutions.' Moreover, children do not automatically fbrfeit their claims for
public support toward an education by choosing to attend non-public schools.
Seventeen years later the Court reviewed a New Jersey case involving the
reimbursement of transportation costs to parents of parochial school children.
It was here that the Court specifically incorporated the Establishment Clause
for application to the states. Everson v. Board of Education61 is often quoted
by strict separationists as the standard for setting the legitimate boundaries
between church and state. In his famous opinion Justice Black assumed the role
of legal historian. He traced the origin and intent of the First Amendment,
citing practices deemed permissible or impermissible under its edicts, and
invoked Jefferson's insurmountable wall.' In fact, however, the Court,
adopting reasoning similar to Cochran, upheld the New Jersey busing program:
New Jersey cannot consistently with the 'establishment of religion' clause contribute
tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which teaches the tenets of faith of
any church. On the other hand, other language of the amendment commands that
New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion.
Consequently, it cannot exclude Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists,
Jews, Methodists, Non-Believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith,
because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare
legislation.70
66. Cochran, 281 U.S. at 374-75.
67. In 1899 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a congressional appropriation in the District
of Columbia for the construction of a Catholic hospital. The Court's unanimous opinion focused on the
secular nature of the hospital's mission. See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
68. Everson v. Board ofEduc., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
69. The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither
a state or the Federal government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence
a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal government can, openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establish-
ment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and state."
Id. at 15-16.
70. Id. at 16. It should be noted that Justices Rutledge, Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton registered
strong dissents in the case, each finding the transportation aid to be impermissible under the First
Amendment.
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The Everson decision elevated the constitutional protection covering
benefits appropriated to parochial school children to a new height, incorporat-
ing it under the shelter of the First Amendment and balancing the requirements
of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses in favor of the latter. If, as
Jefferson urged, the First Amendment would proscribe privileges on the basis
of religious affiliation, so would it assure that one's entitlements not be
abridged because of that same affiliation. To deny parochial school children the
opportunity to participate in a busing program would be a fbrm of religious
discrimination.
c. Boundaries of Accommodation. While the Everson decision introduced
child benefit theory to constitutional analysis through the Free Exercise Clause,
it also set in motion a search to define the permissible interaction between
religion and public education under the Establishment Clause. In 1948 the
Court invalidated a released time program in Champaign, Illinois that allowed
public school children to take up to fbrty-five minutes of religious instruction
each week on the school premises." The religious instructors were not
employees of the school district, but because they were working on school
property, were subject to the supervision of the superintendent. Even though
the program was voluntary and paid fbr with private funds, an eight-person
majority agreed that it was unconstitutional. The decision was grounded on the
fact that religious instruction was being offered in a tax-supported public
building.72
Four years later the Court in Zorach v. Clauson73 affirmed the constitu-
tionality of a similar program in the state of New York. The key difference
between the two programs was that, in the latter, religious instruction was not
given on the premises of the public school. A majority of the Court fbcused on
that distinction to explain the ruling.7" Of particular note in the majority
opinion was the strongly articulated accommodationist language, reminiscent
of the republican tradition, reminding us that "[W]e are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."75 Thus, we are told:
"[W]hen the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious
71. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
72. After restating the principles he had enunciated in the Everson case, Justice Black, writing for
the Court, found:
Here not only are the State's tax-supported school buildings used for the dissemination of
religious doctrine. The State also affords sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that it helps to
provide pupils for their religious classes through the use of the State's compulsory public
school machinery. This is not separation of Church and State.
Id. at 212.
73. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
74. "The 'released time' program involves neither religious instruction nor the expenditure ofpublic
funds.... The case is therefore unlike McCollum v. Board of Educ." Id. at 308-09. Justices Black,
Frankfurter, and Jackson friled separate dissents.
75. Id. at 313.
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authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it
follows the best of our traditions. "76
By mid-century the Court appeared to be moving toward a consistent
approach to First Amendment jurisprudence: striking a balance between
disestablishment and free exercise, validating the child benefit principle,
emphasizing the distinction between direct and indirect aid, and expressing
sympathy and support for religiously inspired activity, but refusing to sanction
religious teaching within the environs of the public school. This emerging
consensus would inform the thinking of the newly constituted Warren Court,
but consistent reasoning on the High Court would be short-lived when it came
to religion.
2. The Modern Court
a. Momentary Continuity. Through the stewardship of Chief Justice Earl
Warren, the Court maintained a sympathetic viewpoint toward religious
tradition and went to great lengths to assure that governmental power-
particularly its own-would not be used to burden the free exercise rights of
individuals. In 1961 it handed down four decisions upholding Sunday closing
laws.' While recognizing that the original purpose of these statutes was to
encourage church attendance, the Chief Justice found the contemporary
objective to be more secular-"to set aside a day of rest and recreation."78 In
response to the point made by the appellants in one case that not all religious
groups observe a Sunday Sabbath, the Chief Justice responded that designating
a particular day of the week for rest was necessary to achieve the secular
purpose of these laws.79
In the area of education, the Warren Court continued to abide by the child
benefit theory on state aid to parochial school parents but vigilantly kept
religious activity out of the public schools. The Court invalidated the daily
76. Id. at 313-14.
77. See Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599 (1961); Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
78. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 448-49. Two years later the Court responded to minority religious
concerns when it upheld the right of a Seventh Day Adventist in South Carolina who had been denied
unemployment compensation because her religion required her to observe the Sabbath on Saturday. See
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In defending the rights of non-Christian secularists to act out
of conscience, the Court also struck down a Maryland law requiring office holders to declare a belief
in God, see Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), and recognized the rights of non-religious
conscientious objectors to avoid conscription inthe military. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437
(1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
In 1972 it ruled that Amish parents who objected for religious reasons did not have to abide by
compulsory education laws requiring them to send their children to school beyond the eighth grade.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
79. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 449-50.
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recitation of a "Regents Prayer" in New York,' ° and the requirement of bible
reading and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer in Pennsylvania tt-both on the
grounds that these practices violated the Establishment Clause. In the later
Schempp case the Court set down the "purpose and effect" criteria for
determining neutrality. 2 Petitioners later would utilize the "Schempp test" in
challenging a textbook loan program in New York State that was made
available to all school children (public, private, or parochial). Citing Cochran
and Everson, the Court in Board of Education v. Allen' upheld the "child
benefit" in question, and found that the challengers had failed to demonstrate
that the "process of secular and religious training in religious schools are so
intertwined that secular textbooks furnished to students by the public are in fact
instrumental in the teaching of religion. " '
b. Contrived Separation. In ruling against the petitioners in Allen, the Court
seemed to purport a rather dubious standard for review of state aid to parochial
students. On one hand, it confirmed the rights of parents to choose a religious
education for their children without penalty; on the other hand, it registered a
concern for the integration of religious and secular themes at parochial schools,
suggesting that if such entanglement could be demonstrated, the Court would
deny assistance to the children and their parents. This reasoning sidestepped the
argument that incorporation of religious values, even into secular subjects, is
the essence of parochial school education. Can religious and secular viewpoints
be separated in such schools? Should government impose such a requirement
in order for children to receive the same "benefits" as their public school
counterparts?
The concern for excessive entanglement between church and state seemed
to take an expedient respite during the early days of the Burger Court in a
landmark case that clarified the financial relationship between the governmental
and ecclesiastic estates. In 1970, the Court in Wlz v. Tax Commission 5
upheld tax exemptions for religious institutions. Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Burger rejected the idea of complete separation in favor of a more
"benevolent neutrality."86 In applying this standard the Court wanted to assure
that religious organizations would be allowed the same privileges as other
political, social, and charitable nonprofit institutions. Thus, in a concurring
80. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
81. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (joined).
82. "[T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." Id. at 222.
83. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). Justice Black, who had voted with the majority inEverson, dissented in
this case.
84. Id. at 248.
85. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
86. "The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely straight line; rigidity
could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions, which is to ensure that no religion be sponsored
or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited." Id. at 669.
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opinion, Justice Harlan prescribed "an equal protection mode of analysis. " "
Justice Brennan, concurring, took the traditional pluralist position in supporting
the exemption, stating that "government grants exemptions to religious
organizations because they uniquely contribute to the pluralism of American
society by their religious activities. " "
A year later the Court again leaned over the wall of separation in order to
accommodate religion,"9 but also announced standards for review that would
ultimately be used to undermine the religious pluralism it had recently praised.
The three-part "Lemon test" forbids any government action that: (1) has no
secular purpose; (2) has a "primary effect" of advancing religion; and (3)
fosters "excessive entanglement" between church and state.' Ironically, in
setting the standards the Court referred liberally to the language of Wlz, which
advised against "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the
sovereign in religious activity."" Taken together, the two cases represent a
bold exercise in judicial contrivance. If forgiving an organization of its tax
burdens does not constitute sponsorship, or at least support, then what does?
Certainly the primary effect of the revenue exemption was to advance religion,
albeit in a pluralist and non-preferential way. Furthermore, processing a salary
supplement for teachers in parochial schools would not necessarily impose
greater administrative burden on the state than would applying the tax laws to
religious organizations in such a distinct manner.'
The confusion of mixed messages that emerged from the bench permitted
the Justices to act with only a hint of philosophical consistency to guide their
First Amendment decisions. In 1973, the famed Nyquist case invalidated a
complicated New York law that provided maintenance and repair grants to
private schools, offered tuition allotments to the poor, and extended tax relief
to other parents who sent their children to private or parochial schools. Given
the case history, it was not surprising that the Court in Nyquist rejected direct
aid to private schools. More unexpected, however, was its response to the
latter provisions. Justice Powell wrote:
87. Id. at 696.
88. Id. at 689.
89. Again writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger explained: "Our prior holdings do not call
for total separation between church and state; total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some
relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable." Lemon v. Kurzman, 403
U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
90. See id. at 614-15. The Court held that giving direct salary supplements to teachers of secular
subjects in private schools was unconstitutional because it would require close oversight by the state and
would therefore lead to excessive entanglement. See id. at 622; see also Dicenso v. Robinson, 91 U.S.
2111 (1971) (companion case).
91. Id. at 614-15 (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 674-76).
92. In Sanders v. Johnson, 403 U.S. 955 (1971), decided two days after the Lemon case, the
Supreme Court sustained a lower court decision invalidating a Connecticut statute that would have paid
a portion of the salaries of private school teachers who taught secular subjects.
93. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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Special tax benefits ... cannot be squared with the principle of neutrality
established by the decisions of this Court. To the contrary, insofar as such benefits
render assistance to parents who send their children to sectarian schools, their
purpose and inevitable effect are to aid and advance those religious institutions.'
Indeed, a problem in this case was that financial aid was made available only
to private school parents. Nevertheless, by fbcusing on the second prong of the
Lemon test-primary effect-the Court seemed to be abandoning the child
benefit principle that it had endorsed in Cochran and Everson. Concentrating
on primary effect ignores the reasoning developed in these two cases, which
fbcused on whether a public good-education-was made neutrally available
to all children. Lemon negated the significance of the distinction between direct
and indirect aid, and replaced it with a superficial understanding of the nature
of the parochial school.95
The Nyquist opinion anchored a number of decisions emerging from the
Burger Court during the 1973 term that prevented both direct and indirect aid
to parochial schools. In Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty96 the Court found unconstitutional the reimbursement of expenses for
services required by the state. It ruled that reimbursement for such mandated
functions as the administration, grading, and reporting of standardized tests was
"impermissible aid to religion" because "the aid that will be devoted to secular
functions is not identifiable and separate from secular activities."' In Sloan
v. Lemon, the Court ruled that Pennsylvania's partial tuition reimbursement for
non-public school parents had an "impermissible effect of advancing
religion" 98 because it furnished "an incentive for parents to send their children
to sectarian schools."' Here Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
ventured to conclude that the "intended consequence is to preserve and support
religion-oriented institutions.""'1
In just one year the Court had moved a great distance from the accommod-
ationist principles it had espoused for more than a quarter century.' Surely,
acknowledging the difficulty of segregating the religious and secular messages
inherent in a parochial school education was a more reasonable and honest
94. Id. at 793.
95. A year earlier the Court had denied without opinion an application to stay a district court ruling
that a parental reimbursement plan in Ohio fostered excessive entanglement between government and
religion. See Essex v. Wolman, 406 U.S. 912 (1972).
96. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
97. Id. at 480.
98. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 830 (1973).
99. Id. at 832.
100. Id.
101. See also Marburger v. Public Funds for Pub. Sch., 413 U.S. 916 (1973) (relying on Nyquist
to grant stay on injunction); Grit v. Woiman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973) (relying on Nyquist to affirm appeal);
Cathedral Academy v. Committee for Pub. Educ. &Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (companion
case to Levitt).
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approach to the question than the confusing language of Allen. But the lesson
communicated in the new jurisprudence was equally disturbing: If families
chose to educate their children in a setting consistent with their own religious
values, they would have to be prepared to forego certain financial supports
made available by the state on a general basis. The wall of separation had been
raised to a new height. 10
c. Ambivalent Neutrality. The Court validated the allocation of public funds
for textbooks made available to parochial students, at the same time as it took
a strong stance against support for auxiliary services within the private
schools."0 3 The fine line distinctions drawn by the Burger Court in these
cases defied reason. Textbook loans were deemed to be a financial benefit "to
parents and children, not to the schools";"t 4 but loaning instructional
materials and equipment "has the unconstitutional primary effect of advancing
religion because of the predominantly religious character of the schools
benefitting from the Act."' Although it was still permissible to provide bus
transportation to parochial schools, the Court found that states were under no
constitutional obligation to provide the same service to public and parochial
school students.0 6 And for some reason, a bus ride to a park or museum was
declared to be in violation of the Constitution when a ride to school was not.
Tax relief initiatives, of course, were also viewed with disfavor-at least
temporarily.'07
The high wall of separation began to fall in 1980, when the Court, in a 5-4
decision, upheld a New York law that allocated funds to private and parochial
schools for the administration of state examinations and the collection of school
enrollment and attendance data. 10 8 In 1973 the Court in Levitt'09 had sus-
102. The Court seemed to vary from its strict separationist approach in one 1973 case. In Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973), the Court upheld a South Carolina statute which involved a state
authority in financing bonds for a Baptist College. Here the Court reasoned-rather remarkably for this
year-that the arrangement did not violate the dictates of the Lemon test. However, it is worthy to note
that the Court has sometimes set a different standard for separation in higher education than at the
elementary and secondary level. This distinction was made particularly clear in 1971 when it upheld a
federal program of grants and loans made available to sectarian colleges. Here, in drawing the
distinction the Court reasoned that college students are less impressionable than younger children. Tilton
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971).
103. In Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), the Court approved part of a Pennsylvania statute
that loaned textbooks to sectarian schools, but struck down a portion of the same law that would make
specialized teachers and therapists available. In Wolman v. Walters, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), the Court
validated funding for textbook loans, standardized tests, diagnostic services, and therapeutic services,
but struck down the sections of the same Ohio law providing for instructional materials and field trips.
See also Marburger v. Public Funds for Pub. Sch., 417 U.S. 961 (1964) (striking down parental
reimbursement plan and purchase of auxiliary services).
104. Meek, 421 U.S. at 360 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968)).
105. Id. at 363.
106. See Leutkemeyer v. Kaufman, 419 U.S. 888 (1974).
107. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. United Americans for Pub. Sch., 419 U.S. 890 (1974); Byrne v.
Public Funds for Pub. Sch., 442 U.S. 907 (1979) (mem.).
108. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
109. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
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tamined a determination that a similar New York statute was unconstitutional,
pointing to the difficulty in separating secular and religious functions. Now
such activity would be found to be primarily secular. 110 The decision
appeared to be a victory for accommodationists, except that it was attenuated
on the faulty reasoning originally articulated in Allen."' It inferred that it
was possible to isolate secular activities from the religious environment that
permeates a sectarian school, or indeed that it was necessary to do so in order
to pass constitutional muster.
In 1983, the Court upheld a Minnesota law that granted a tax deduction to
parents for expenses incurred for tuition, textbooks, or transportation, whether
their children attended public, private, or parochial schools. Mueller v.
Allen... would prove to be a landmark decision for several reasons. Not only
did it validate tax relief fur parochial school parents, but in drawing a
distinction between direct aid and indirect aid, it reinforced the notion of
parental choice. As Justice Rehnquist wrote for the 5-4 majority, where, as
here, "aid to parochial schools is available only as a result of decisions of
individual parents no 'imprimatur of state approval'. . . can be deemed to have
been conferred on any particular religion, or on religion generally."1 3
Recognizing that most parents who had taken advantage of the Minnesota law
had children in Catholic schools, Rehnquist suggested a relaxation of the
"primary effect" prong of the Lemon test. While admitting that judicial
inquiries in this area have been "guided . . . by the three-part test," he
declared that it is no more than "a helpful signpost in dealing with Establish-
ment Clause challenges."' 14
In revitalizing the child benefit theory, the Court continued to draw an
opaque boundary of separation that would prompt scrutiny of state aid directly
110. 444 U.S. at 657.
111. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
112. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 387 (1983). During the same term the Court upheld Nebraska's
practice of paying a chaplain to open its legislative sessions with a prayer, describing the practice as "a
tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people of this country." Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983). Remarkably, the Court did not find it problematic that the
legislature had chosen to use the same Presbyterian minister for sixteen consecutive years.
113. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
114. Id. at 393 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)). A year later Chief Justice
Burger declared that neither the Lemon test nor any other "fixed per se rle" was appropriate in
reviewing First Amendment cases. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984). In the same case,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor proposed an alternative "endorsement test" asserting that government
violates the Establishment Clause when it endorses or disapproves of religion. She further explained:
"Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message." Id.
In 1992 Justice Kennedy introduced a less rigorous coercion standard that granted government
greater latitude in accommodating religion and restricted activity that either coerced someone to
participate in or to support a religion, or that granted direct benefits to a religion. See Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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allocated to nonpublic schools. Even though Regan..5 previously sustained
the reimbursement of expenses for state-required programs, the Court refused
to allow a general appropriation to parochial schools for programs described
as secular. 16 In 1985 the Court also invalidated New York's practice of
providing federally supported instructional services to poor children on the
premises of parochial institutions." 7 The Court seemed gradually to be
inching its way toward a clearer set of standards for interpreting the First
Amendment and its relevance to education.
3. An Emerging Pluralism
Perhaps Justice Rehnquist sent his strongest message disapproving the
Lemon standard and its inherent separatism-as enshrined by the Court in
Everson-when he dissented in Jaffree. Playing the part of constitutional
historian, the future Chief Justice claimed, "[t]here is simply no historical
foundation for the proposition that the Framers intended to build the 'wall of
separation' that was constitutionalized in Everson.""18 Furthermore, he
explained, the Lemon test merely repeats the historical error, promoting a body
of case law that "has no basis in the history of the amendment it seeks to
interpret, is difficult to apply, and yields unprincipled results .. ."119 The
Rehnquist Court would eventually adopt a less ambivalent approach to religious
accommodation, extending the principles articulated in Mueller to define the
permissible financial relationship between government and nonpublic schools.
a. Financial Aid. In 1986 a unanimous Supreme Court held in Witters v.
Wshington Department of Social Services20 that the First Amendment was
not offended when a blind student used a public scholarship to attend a bible
college. The reasoning in Witters focused on the fact that, unlike the situations
in Nyquist and Sloan, the financial aid in question here was made available to
all students, not just those in sectarian schools. Justice Marshall, writing for
the majority, indicated that while some of this aid would find its way to
religious schools, the benefit is "only a result of the genuinely independent and
private choices of aid recipients. "1"1 In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell
115. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
116. See Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). The Court had actually upheld a
government subsidy for private colleges as long as the funds were not used for religious purposes.
Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976). The Court also maintained a strict disapproval
of any activity within public schools that could be considered religious in nature. See Stone v. Graham
449 U.S. 39 (1980) (invalidating Kentucky statute requiring that Ten Commandments be posted on walls
of public schools); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking down Alabama's moment of silence,
meditation, and prayer).
117. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). This decision is currently being challenged. See
infra note 301.
118. 472 U.S. at 106.
119. Id. at 112.
120. Witters v. Washington Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
121. Id. at 487.
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outlined three factors that set a new standard for reviewing cases of state aid
to religious schools and their students: (1) The program is neutral on its face
regarding religion; (2) Funds are equally available to public and private
schools; and (3) Any aid to sectarian institutions is the result of private choices
by individuals. 1
22
In 1993 the Court in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District
23
reversed a Ninth Circuit decision to uphold the right of a Catholic high school
student to receive the service of a sign language interpreter under the
provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Act. Petitioners would have
denied this handicapped student the same services that were available to public
school children because his parents had chosen to send him to a school with a
religious affiliation. Citing Mueller and Witters, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
a majority of the Court disagreed: "When the government offers a neutral
service on the premises of a sectarian school as part of a general program that
'is no way skewed towards religion,' . . . it follows under our prior decisions
that provision of that service does not offend the Establishment Clause.""
To the extent that it has seized upon the idea of individual choice, the
Rehnquist Court has constructed a more compelling rationale for accommoda-
tion than it does in purporting a false dichotomy between the secular and
religious aspects of parochial schooling. The hallmark of the Rehnquist Court,
however, has been to advance religious tolerance based on the precept that the
Establishment Clause not be misapplied to encumber or disadvantage
individuals or groups because of their religious orientation. This Court strives
to assure that religious affiliation will not serve to deny entitlements to some
that are made available to all as a matter of general public policy. This
approach is evident beyond the field of education,'25 manifesting itself most
apparently in a jurisprudence that has emerged in conjunction with those First
Amendment freedoms that do not exclusively apply to religion.
b. Speech, Assembly, and Access. In 1991 the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of The Equal Access Act'26 when it ruled that public schools
must permit student religious clubs to meet on campus under the same terms
122. Id. at 490-92.
123. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
124. Id. at 2467.
125. In 1988, for example, the Court ruled that federal funds appropriated under the Adolescent
Family Life Act could be granted to Catholic organizations that discouraged adolescent sexual activity
and abortion. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). See also LEVY, supra note 13, at 217-20.
126. The Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (a)(1994), prohibits
any public secondary school which receives Federal financial assistance and which has a
limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any
students who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the
religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings.
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as other non-curricular organizations.l" To do otherwise, the Court rea-
soned, would violate freedom of association and free exercise rights as well as
the Fourteenth Amendment, and "demonstrate not neutrality but hostility
toward religion."128 Three years later in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
School District,'29 the Court determined that it violates free speech when a
public school denies the use of its facilities to a church wishing to show a film
with a religious viewpoint.
The funding and free speech issues were merged most intimately in
Rosenberger v. Rectors of the University of Virginia.130 In this recent case a
public university refused to allow student activities fees to be used by a student
organization for the publication of a newspaper with a Christian message
because it "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a
deity or an ultimate reality." 13' Citing both Lamb's Chapel and Widmar, the
Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision found that the plaintiffs had been the victims
of viewpoint discrimination in violation of free speech protected by the First
Amendment. 3
2
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, distinguished "between
government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids,
and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses protect. "'13 Because the newspaper in question was
produced by a private student organization, it was covered by the latter. Since
the funding sought by the group was made available to a wide variety of
student organizations, including religious organizations, the program was
deemed to be religiously neutral."3 In fact, the Court ruled, to scrutinize and
disqualify documents on the basis of religious content not only jeopardizes
127. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). As early as 1981, the Supreme Court
ruled that it was unconstitutional for a university to ban religious assemblies at a public university.
Rejecting the separationist claims made by the university to justify the exclusion, the Court ruled that
providing equal access "'would no more commit the University ... to religious goals', than it is 'now
committed to the goals of the Students for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance,' or any
other group eligible to use its facilities." Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981).
128. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248.
129. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
130. Rosenberger v. Rectors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
131. Id. at 2515.
132. Vital First Amendment speech principles are at stake here. The first danger to liberty lies
in granting the state the power to examine publications to determine whether or not they are
based on some ultimate idea and if so for the state to classify them. The second, and corollary,
danger is to speech from the chilling of individual thought and expression.
Id. at 2520.
133. Id. at 2522.
134. "We have held that the guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the
government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose
ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse .... The government
program here is neutral toward religion." Id. at 2521-22.
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neutrality, but is "a denial of the right of free speech and would risk fostering
a pervasive bias or hostility to religion."135
In a concurring opinion Justice Thomas launched an extended critique of
"Establishment Clause jurisprudence," which he described as being "in
hopeless disarray." 36 He pointed to the great irony inherent in the alz
decision, which allows tax exemptions for religious institutions while the Court
agonizes over the prospect of direct aid to such organizations. 37  The
underlying message of Thomas's opinion, echoing that of the majority, struck
a note that would serve to amplify the distinction between the Rehnquist
Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause and that of the Burger Court:
"The Clause does not compel the exclusion of religious groups from
government benefit programs that are generally available to a broad class of
participants. "131
These speech, assembly, and access cases reflect the Court's growing
concern for equality of treatment for religious persons and organizations, which
complements the school cases described earlier. Just as religious parents can
not be burdened because of their faith in educating their children in schools of
their choice, so, too, religious citizens generally cannot be denied access to
resources otherwise available to all.
c. Implications for Choice. Michael McConnell has criticized both the
Warren and Burger Courts for embracing the idea of a secular state, exhibiting
a hostility to, or at least an indifference toward, people of faith and the
churches to which they belong. 39 The resulting jurisprudence promoted a
freedom from religion rather than a freedom of religion."4 A review of the
case law indicates that the observation carries more validity with regard to the
Burger Court than its predecessor.' In fact one of the remarkable features
of the new pluralism evolving from the loosely aligned Rehnquist majority'42
is a return to certain constitutional precedents that governed the Supreme Court
during the stewardship of Chief Justice Earl Warren. Not only has the
135. Id. at 2525.
136. Id. at 2532.
137. A tax exemption in many cases is economically and functionally indistinguishable from
a direct monetary subsidy. In one instance, the government relieves religious entities (along
with others) of a generally applicable tax; in the other, it relieves religious entities (along with
others) of some or all of the burden of that tax by returning it in the form of a cash subsidy.
Whether the benefit is provided at the front or back end of the taxation process, the financial
aid to religious groups is undeniable.
Id. at 2531-32.
138. Id. at 2532.
139. See McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra note 5, at 115-17, 168-69.
140. See id. at 127-34 (arguing that Supreme Court has frustrated general purpose of religion
clauses to further religious liberty).
141. See JOSEPH E. BRYSON & SAMUEL H. HOUSTON JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC
FUNDS FOR RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS: THE BURGER YEARS, 1969-1986, at 51-130 (1990).
142. In addition to Chief Justice Rehnquist, this majority appears to include Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas.
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presumption of strict separation begun to subside, but religious organizations
are viewed more positively as institutions that are valued for their contribution
to the civic culture. 143
The Rehnquist Court has not always demonstrated a consistent First
Amendment philosophy. For example in 1990, it held that religious believers
are not entitled to exemptions from generally applicable governmental
requirements.'" This decision not only contradicts a well-established
constitutional tradition 145 but also weakens the momentum of a Court that has
aggressively sought to protect the free exercise of religion. 46 While
Rehnquist's earlier opinions revealed a nonpreferentialist philosophy that might
have opened the door for direct aid to religious institutions, 47 the Court has
not indicated strong movement in that direction thus far. To the contrary, it has
interpreted the Establishment Clause in a way that generally inhibits the direct
flow of public funds to parochial schools. 148 Indirect aid, however, is another
matter. Not only has the Court given its approval of such assistance, it has
actually developed a set of guidelines that can be used by policymakers at the
143. This more accommodating approach to religion is also evident in the other branches of
government, reflecting a changing political mood in the nation. In 1993 Congress passed and President
Clinton signed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994), which
prohibits the government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion unless it can be
demonstrated that the burden "is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest" and "is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (b) (1994).
This statute has received a mixed response in the lower courts. For example, in Flores v. City of
Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D.Tex. 1995), a district court judge ruled that RFRA is a legislative
attempt to usurp judicial power and overturn the standards set in the Smith decision. In Belgard v.
Hawaii, 883 F. Supp. 510 (D.Haw. 1955), a judge ruled that the RFRA is constitutional pursuant to
Congress's enforcement power under § 5 of the 14th Amendment. The potential impact of RFRA is
difficult to assess until the Supreme Court rules on it. So long as it exists, however, it will be easier to
initiate litigation against state action that specifically excludes religious institutions from participating
in publicly supported choice programs.
144. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that generally applicable law
not directed at particular religious groups is binding even where law conflicts with tenets of faith). For
commentary on this important and controversial case, see Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G.
Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61
U. Cm-. L. REv. 1245 (1994); William P. Marshall, In Defense ofSmith and Free Exercise Revisionism,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109 (1990).
145. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971);
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 333 (1965); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
146. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993), the
Court limited the reach of Smith and upheld the right of Santerians to perform animal sacrifices in their
religious ceremonies, ruling that laws lacking general applicability must be justified by demonstrating
that they satisfy a compelling governmental interest.
147. This was evident in Jaffree, where he proposed that the Establishment Clause "did [not]
prohibit the Federal Government from providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion." 472 U.S. 38 at 106.
See, LEVY, supra note 13, at 113-14; McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra note 5, at 145-47.
148. In 1994 the Court ruled that the creation of a school district with boundaries that were
coterminous with the boundaries of a religious community was unconstitutional because it had the effect
of endorsing and promoting particular religious beliefs. Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512
U.S. 687 (1994). The Court also refused to permit a public school to have prayers delivered by a
clergyman as part of a commencement ceremony. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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federal, state, and local levels. 149 This approach can be summarized in terms
of three basic points: (1) that aid is given to an individual parent or child,
rather than to an institution; (2) that any benefit accrued by an institution is the
result of individual choices made by the parent or student; and (3) that aid is
appropriated on a religiously neutral basis to those who attend public schools
as well as those who attend private and parochial schools.
In order to understand the philosophy that undergirds these standards, we
must focus upon the rights guaranteed the individual, rather than the threat that
institutions can pose to these rights. These principles flow from the Court's
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause and an understanding that the actual
individual rights spun from it should have greater weight than the potential
threat of Establishment Clause violations. Like the remainder of the Bill of
Rights, this jurisprudence is concerned with the primacy of the individual, i.e.,
the ability of individuals to practice their faith as they choose without any
encumbrances-direct or indirect-from the state. It is a subtle but profound
difference in emphasis. For the Court to reverse this priority is like the hen
who protects the nest but loses the egg. Absent a compelling state interest,
there is no constitutional reason, even under the Establishment Clause, to limit
religiously motivated action. Taking a similar position on the proper balance
between the two constitutional prescriptions, Professor Laurence Tribe has
observed:
Whenever both religion clauses are potentially relevant .... the dominance of the
free exercise clause follows from the principles underlying both clauses .... In
the context of these general values, we must consider whether a nation committed
to religious pluralism must, in the age of the affirmative state, make active
provision for maximum diversity; we must ask whether, in the present age,
religious tolerance must cease to be simply a negative principle and must become
a positive commitment that encourages the flourishing of conscience ... it seems
doubtful that sacrificing religious freedom on the altar of anti-establishment would
do justice to the hopes of the Framers."'
II. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES
A. Defining the Relationship
Perhaps the greatest anxiety haunting those who attended the Constitutional
Convention involved the question of federalism. Indeed, the very idea of the
Convention was provocative, with representatives of "sovereign states"
149. But see Steven K. Green, The Legal Argument Against Private School Choice, 62 UNIV. CIN.
L. REv. 37 (1993) (arguing that current jurisprudence would still invalidate most choice programs).
150. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1204 (2d ed. 1988); see also Michael
A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence, 61 NOTRE DAMm L. REv. 311 (1986) (arguing that religion clauses should be
read to foster equal protection of common goal of religious liberty).
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assembling to decide upon a new "Law of the Land."' Anti-federalists
feared that the new arrangement would lead to the demise of the states.' 52
Particularly troubling was the structure of the judicial branch, which would be
both powerful and independent.' 53 When the final bargain was struck, it
appeared that those favoring a strong central government had prevailed. But the
power of the national government would be tempered by bedrock principles
such as popular sovereignty and reserved powers, and eventually by the
drafting of a Bill of Rights. 5 ' Philip Kurland describes federalism as "the
most original contribution to constitutionalism made by the Founders in
Philadelphia."' 55 But Kurland is not convinced that the original balance
established between the central and state governments was very secure.' 56
1. Incorporation and the Fourteenth Amendment'57
On several occasions prior to the passage of the Civil War amendments, the
Court had indicated that the Bill of Rights had no bearing on state govern-
151. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2.
152. For extended commentary on the antifederalist position, see STEVEN BOYD, THE POLITICS OF
OPPOSITION: ANTIFEDERALISTS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1979); JACKSON T. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDER-
ALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781-1788 (1961); HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-
FEDERALISTS WERE FOR (1981).
153. See Gary L. McDowell, Federalism and Civic Virtue: TheAntifederalists and the Constitution,
in How FEDERAL IS THE CONSTITUTION? 122 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1987).
154. See WOOD, supra note 44, at 519-64, 593-618.
155. Philip B. Kurland, Federalism and the Federal Courts, 2 BENCHMARK 17, 17 (1986).
156. For a short but comprehensive discussion of contemporary arguments for and against the
American federalist system, see DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995).
157. There remains some debate among scholars whether the Fourteenth Amendment was intended
to incorporate the Bill of Rights for enforcement against the states. See, e.g., MICHAEL K. CURTIS, No
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986) (sympathiz-
ing with incorporationist viewpoint); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR
POLITICS? 116-60 (1994) (offering balanced treatment of various perspectives). But see RAOUL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); Akhil
R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L. J. 1193 (1992) (offering more
critical interpretations of incorporation).
Although the primary motivation behind the Amendment's passage was to protect blacks after the
Civil War, there was no mention of race in its wording; therefore the door was left ajar for a broader
interpretation of civil rights. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM
POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988) (providing detailed account of original thinking
behind Fourteenth Amendment and its subsequent evolution through judicial interpretation). On the other
hand, since the purpose behind the Bill of Rights was to limit the powers of the federal government, one
might reasonably argue that to apply these curbs against the states would have been counterproductive.
At stake was the very meaning of federalism for the young nation. Original intent notwithstanding, the
Supreme Court has addressed the issue decisively, if not quite as expeditiously. Cq. Philip B. Kurland,
The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme
Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 11 (1979) ("[Ilncorporation of the religion clauses is a fait accompli;
whether it was effected by ipse dixit or by reason no longer matters"). See generally William J.
Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1961).
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ments. 155 Even after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
was slow to recognize its potential as a vehicle fbr extending individual rights
to the states, choosing instead to adopt a policy of selective incorporation. 59
In 1937 Justice Cardozo, writing fbr the majority, declared that the Due
Process Clause only incorporates those rights that were "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.""' ° The Court did not expressly hold that these rights
included the free exercise of religion until 1940,16x and the Establishment
Clause was not incorporated until significantly later. 62 Nevertheless, the
Court maintained a selective approach to incorporation thereafter. 6 3 Al-
though the Court, in principle, has maintained a selective approach to
incorporation, in practice it has managed to cast the net of federal protection
over all but a few provisions of the Bill of Rights against infringement by the
states. 64
2. The Blaine Amendment
In December 1875, Congressman James Blaine of Maine proposed a
Constitutional amendment that would prohibit the states from allocating funds
to support parochial schools.'65 The proposal received strong backing in both
158. In 1833 Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the Federal Constitution "was ordained and
established by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the
government of individual states." Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 243 (1833). In 1845, the
Court specifically addressed the First Amendment issue: "The Constitution makes no provision for
protecting the citizens of the respective states in their religious liberties; this is left to the state
constitutions and laws." Permoli v. City of New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589, 609 (3 How.) (1845).
159. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (16 Wall.) (1872); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). The turning point in the case law came in 1905,
when the Supreme Court used the 14th Amendment to overturn a labor statute in New York. Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See NELSON, supra note 157, at 197-200.
160. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). These would encompass "those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions" and are
.so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Id. (citation
omitted).
161. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
162. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1 (1947).
163. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). It was in this case that Justice Black offered
his famous dissent on incorporation under the 14th Amendment:
One of the chief objects that the provisions of the Amendment's first section, separately, and
as a whole, were intended to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights, applicable to the
states. With full knowledge of the import of the Barron decision, the Framers and the backers
of the Fourteenth Amendment proclaimed its purpose to be to overrun the constitutional rule
that case had announced.
Id. at 71-72 (Black, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). For an opposing view from the Court, see Felix
Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARv. L. REv. 746 (1965).
164. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 396-421 (12th ed., 1991).
165. No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the support of public
schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall
ever be under the control of any religious sect; nor shall any money so raised or lands so
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Houses of Congress but fell four votes short of the required two-thirds majority
in the Senate to succeed.' t 6 Legal historians often point to the episode as
further evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment had not extended the
Establishment Clause to the states, for if it had, the Blaine Amendment would
not have received such serious consideration.' In an open letter to the New
York Times, Blaine described his effort as an attempt to correct a "constitution-
al defect;" since the First Amendment was designed only to prevent Congress
from establishing a religion, "states were left free to do as they pleased." 68
One might also argue, however, that as the proposed amendment failed to
generate enough support to pass, there was strong sentiment throughout the
country to let the states decide such issues for themselves without intrusion
from the federal government."6
What Diane Ravitch, in her seminal history of New York City's education
system, has described as the first of the "Great School Wars" was already in
full swing in several American cities where immigration had swelled the ranks
of the Catholic population. 7' Church leaders in Philadelphia, Boston, Balti-
more, and New York City resisted the blatant Protestantism that had dominated
the public school curriculum in the fbrm of prayers, hymns, and bible reading
(the King James version, of course)' 7' and eventually began to set up their
own schools. As Catholic political power accumulated in cities, so did appeals
devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations.
JORGENSON, supra note 60, at 138-39 (quoting Blaine Amendment).
166. The vote was 180-7 in the House of Representatives and 28-16 (27 Members not voting) in
the Senate. See Alfred W. Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. L. REV.
939, 942, 944 (1951).
167. For a historical analysis of the issue, see Stephen K. Green, The Blaine Amendment
Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38 (1992).
168. F. William O'Brien, The States and "No Establishment": Proposed Amendments to the
Constitution Since 1789, 4 WASHBURN L.J. 186 (1965).
169. Behind the constitutional question was a more volatile political issue tied to the electoral stakes
of the Republican and Democratic parties and to a growing anti-Catholic sentiment that politicians sought
to exploit. Blaine himself had used the proposal to launch a campaign for the Republican presidential
nomination. For an analysis of the partisan political motivations behind the Blaine Amendment, see
Marie Carolyn Klinkhamer, The Blaine Amendment of 1875: Private Motives for Public Action, 42
CATH. HIST. REv. 15 (1955).
In a message presented to the Congress earlier in 1845, President Ulysses Grant, capitalizing on the
worst nativist impulses that were infecting the nation, announced his support for a similar amendment:
prohibiting the granting of any school funds or taxes, or any part thereof, either by the
legislative, municipal, or other authority, for the benefit or in aid, directly or indirectly, of
any religious sect or denomination, or in aid or for the benefit of any other object of any
nature or kind whatever.
Green, supra note 167, at 52. Neither Blaine nor Grant prevailed.
170. Ravitch traces the outbreak of the first struggle for power over the New York City schools
to the 1840s. See DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS: NEw YORK CITY, 1805-1973, at 3-76
(1974) [hereinafter THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS].
171. Stephen Green, in his historical essay, explained the rather distinct approach to disestablish-
ment which was common during the period: "Reading from the Protestant Bible was considered
nonsectarian-despite Catholic and Jewish assertions otherwise-and not seen as a violation of either the
free exercise or establishment clauses." Green, supra note 167, at 69.
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before state legislatures for aid to parochial schools.17 At the same time
voluntary associations began to crop up in order to preserve the religious
aspects of the public school curriculum and to protect the common culture from
the growing Catholic menace. 173 The Blaine Amendment was a product of
that sentiment 74 and, even after its defeat, found its way onto the Republican
national party platform and a campaign against "Rum, Romanism, and
Rebellion. 175
Despite its defeat in Congress, the Blaine Amendment and the antipathy it
engendered toward non-Protestant religions would leave a significant legacy in
the states and territories of the United States. In 1894 New York became the
first state in the nation to enact a Blaine Amendment in its constitution
prohibiting direct or indirect aid to parochial schools. 176 In 1899 Congress
passed enabling legislation that would divide the Dakotas into two states and
permit them, along with Montana and Washington, to draft constitutions but
would require that each constitution adopt language similar to that of the Blaine
Amendment."7 New Mexico achieved statehood only on the condition, set
by Congress, that it adopt a strong constitutional provision precluding state aid
to private schools. 17 By 1876 fourteen states had enacted legislation prohibit-
172. See JORGENSON, supra note 60, at 20-158.
173. See generally RAY A. BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE, 1800-1860: A STUDY OF THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM (1938); J. HIGMAN, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF
AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (1955).
174. Green has noted a number of journalistic responses to the political discourse surrounding the
Blaine Amendment. The Catholic World, for example, criticized "politicians who hope to ride into
power by awakening the spirit of fanaticism and religious bigotry among us." Green, supra note 167
at 53, 54 (quoting The President's Message, CATHOLIC WORLD, Feb. 1876, at 707, 711). The Nation,
which was sympathetic to the Blaine Amendment, admitted:
Mr. Blaine did, indeed, bring forward .. . a Constitutional amendment directed against the
Catholics, but the anti-Catholic excitement was, as every one knows now, a mere flurry; and all that
Mr. Blaine means to do or can do with his amendment is, not to pass it but to use it in the campaign
to catch anti-Catholic votes.
Green, supra note 167, at 54 (quoting THE NATION, Mar. 16, 1876, at 173).
The St. Louis Republican carried an article warning, "The signs of the times indicate all an intention
on the part of the managers of the Republican party to institute a general war against the Catholic
Church." Green, supra note 167, at 44.
175. KIRK PORTER & DONALD JOHNSON, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840-1964, at 51-52
(1966).
176. Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof shall use the property or credit or any public
money ... directly or indirectly in aid or maintenance .... of any school or institution of
learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious denomination, or in
which any denomination tenet or doctrine is taught.
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (as passed in 1894). New York actually had a similar law on the books since
1844. 1844 N.Y. LAws, ch. 320 § 12.
177. Act of Feb. 22, 1899, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676 (1889). See Robert F. Utter & Edward J. Larson,
Church and State on the Frontier: The History of the Establishment Clauses in the Washington State
Constitution, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 451, 458-69 (1988).
178. See ROBERT LARSON, NEW MEXICO'S QUEST FOR STATEHOOD, 1846-1912 (1968); THOMAS
WILEY, PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATION IN NEW MEXICO (1965).
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ing the use of public school funds for religious schools; by 1890 twenty-nine
states had adopted constitutional requirements along the same lines. 17
9
It is one of the great ironies of American constitutional history that the
Blaine Amendment, which erupted out of a spirit of religious bigotry and a
politics that sought to promote Protestantism in public schools, eventually
became an emblem of religious freedom in some states. The turn of the century
witnessed numerous attempts by Protestant clergymen to eliminate parochial
schools by enacting rigid state inspection laws and compulsory education
requirements that students could fulfill only by attending public schools."is
The outcome of these ugly conflicts varied, depending upon the history,
culture, and traditions that shaped politics in each of the state capitols.
3. Judicial Federalism
Religious freedom in America is the product of a dynamic process of
interaction between the federal government and the states, defined at various
points in time by constitutional principles, legislative enactments, and judicial
interpretations. The Warren Court was especially aggressive at utilizing the
Equal Protection Clause to expand human rights in areas such as education,
criminal procedure, and reapportionment. 18' When the judicial activism of the
Warren Court gave way to the more restrained and conservative Burger
Court,"s this turnover led to a call for a "new federalism" among civil rights
proponents in the states. One of the loudest sirens was sounded by a member
of the Warren Court majority itself, Justice William Brennan." His voice
was accompanied by a chorus of scholars who urged the state judiciaries to
seize the moment and fill the perceived void left by the once activist High
Court. I"
179. See Green, supra note 167, at 43.
180. See JORGENSON, supra note 60, at 159-86 (documenting battle over state inspection laws in
Massachusetts), 187-201 (regarding Bennett law in Wisconsin), 201-04 (regarding Edwards law in
Illinois), 205-15 (discussing Oregon School Law and legislative activity in Washington, Ohio, and
California).
181. For a sympathetic review of the Warren Court, see ARCHIBALD Cox, THE WARREN COURT:
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM (1968). For more critical assessments, see
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); PHILIP B.
KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT (1970).
182. For an overview of the Burger Court, see THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION
THAT WASN'T (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983); A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights
in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976).
183. See William J. Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions
as Guardians ofIndividual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 548 (1986) ("For a decade now, I have felt
certain that the Court's contraction of federal rights and remedies on grounds of federalism should be
interpreted as a plain invitation to state courts to step into the breach") [hereinafter The Bill of Rights
and the States].
184. See Shirley S. Abramson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1141 (1985); Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory
and State Courts, 18 GA. L. Rv. 165 (1984); Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1985); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow:
Yale Law & Policy Review
Notwithstanding the good intentions of state-based reformers, there was an
irony to the new judicial federalism they rallied, since it was state governments
who had initially driven the Warren Court to rescue equality in the areas of
education, criminal justice, and voting. Some scholars more realistically
recognized the state judiciaries' institutional inertia and incapacity to take the
lead on important cases, particularly those involving pivotal constitutional
issues." 5 Others saw the response to the Burger Court as a political reaction
motivated by ideology.'8 6 Still others greeted the passing of the Warren Court
as an opportunity to recapture the notion of state sovereignty that was lost
during its intergovernmental revolution."
The new judicial federalism proved especially confounding on issues of
church and state. Given that the Burger Court had generated considerable
confusion over, if not a retreat from, the protection of religious freedom, what
would it mean for the states to fill the void? Unlike other rights guaranteed by
the Constitution, securing religious liberty is a matter of striking the proper
balance between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses-a zero sum
equation. What might increased state activism reap today in the context of the
Rehnquist Court's First Amendment jurisprudence? Rebuilding the wall of
separation being chipped away by the Court would not necessarily enhance the
free exercise of religion, and might in fact hinder it, depending upon one's
perspective.
A survey completed by Bryson and Houston in 1990 indicated that forty-
two states provide some kind of direct or indirect financial support to schools
with religious affiliations. 8 ' Among these, thirty states give assistance in the
form of transportation and/or textbooks and materials.8 9 Nine states have
lunch programs,"9 and thirteen provide health services to students.' 9'
Another survey indicates that twenty-one state constitutions proscribe state aid,
support, or maintenance for religious schools;" 92 and three expressly ban even
Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353 (1984).
185. See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REv.
761 (1992); Ellen A. Peters, State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law Tradition, 84
MICH. L. REv. 583 (1986).
186. See Earle M. Maltz, The Political Dynamic of the "New Judicial Federalism, "2 EMERGING
ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 233 (1989).
187. See Gary McDowell, Rediscovering Federalism: State Constitutional Law and the Restoration
of State Sovereignty, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 797 (1991). For further commentary on the phenomenon of
judicial federalism and its impact, see Donald E. Batterson, Comment, A Trend Ephemeral? Eternal?
Neither? A Durational Look at the New Judicial Federalism, 42 EMORY L.J. 209 (1993); Ronald K.L.
Collins, The Once New Judicial Federalism and its Critics, 64 WASH. L. REv. 5 (1989).
188. See BRYSON & HOUSTON, supra note 141, at 54.
189. According to the survey, 27 states provide transportation, 17 offer textbooks, and 6 provide
other instructional materials. See id. at 59.
190. See id. at 61.
191. See id.
192. See Note, Beyond the Establishment Clause: Enforcing Separation of Church and State
Through State Constitutional Provisions, 71 VA. L. REv. 625, 633 (1985) [hereinafter Beyond the
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indirect assistance.'" How does one explain the apparent discrepancies
between constitutional stipulations and actual practice in some states? The key
to understanding the standards that prevail in various jurisdictions is found in
constitutional interpretation by the state courts." 9 These determinations are
not always consistent with the guidelines that have been set by the Supreme
Court.
B. The States Speak
While the Court has, for the most part, taken a negative view on direct
public assistance to sectarian institutions, it has permitted aid to parents who
choose to send their children to parochial schools so long as such aid is
appropriated on a religiously neutral basis. This approach is consistent with an
emerging pluralist philosophy on the Court, which not only seeks to accommo-
date individual religious viewpoints, but is also vigilant in assuring that practice
based on such convictions is not unduly burdened by a government-imposed
secularism. Not every state has abided by this general standard. Some state
courts have imposed aid restrictions that are much more limiting towards
religious schools and the individuals who choose them.
At one time or another courts in nearly half the states have issued
pronouncements indicating that they do not consider the Court's decisions to
be binding in interpreting their own constitutions. 95 Several have specifically
rejected the "child benefit theory.""' 6 Federal rulings to the contrary, many
state courts have, from time to time, invalidated public assistance to private or
parochial school students in the form of transportation' 97 or textbooks. 198
Since federal standards do not require such support, these decisions are not
necessarily unconstitutional so long as they do not discriminate against parents
or children on the basis of religious considerations. Nevertheless, as Alan Tarr
has pointed out, some states have actually revised their constitutions in order
Establ'shment Clause].
193. See id.
194. For an overview of the evolution of state-based jurisprudence, see CHESTER JAMES ANTIEU
Er AL., RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1965); G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the
States, 64 WASH. L. REv. 73 (1989).
195. See supra note 192, at 634. Twelve have specifically indicated that they have stricter standards
of separation in their own constitutions. See id. at 641.
196. See Beyond the Establishment Clause, supra note 192, at 636. One Nebraska court described
the child benefit principle as "a contention that ignores substance for form, reality for rhetoric, and
would lead to total circumvention of the principles of our Constitution and the First Amendment."
Gaffney v. State Dep't of Educ., 220 N.W.2d 550, 556 (Neb. 1974).
197. See Tarr, supra note 194, at 99.
198. See id. at 98-99.
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to adjust to more permissive federal criteria."9 In so doing, they have
provided better insurance against state action that could possibly infringe upon
free exercise rights protected by the First Amendment.
Although it is not possible within the context of this article to perform a
complete survey of constitutional standards that have been adopted by the fifty
states, a selective review can be informative in demonstrating the kind of
inconsistency that persists both among the states, and between the states and
the standards set by the Court. Focusing particularly on the subject of state aid
to religious schools, this Article will briefly consider the case law in six
jurisdictions: New York, Washington, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Wiscon-
sin, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The review, although far from
comprehensive, offers some insight into how our system of judicial federalism
has resulted in conflicting interpretations of religious freedom that require
attention and sometimes remedy by the federal government.
1. New York
New York is one state whose church-state jurisprudence has been
characterized by a long-standing historical dialogue between its constitution, its
legislature and its courts. This dialogue, nevertheless, has been inconclusive in
determining how the issue of educational choice would actually be received if
it were to become a serious policy consideration.2"e As early as 1844, the
state legislature passed a statute prohibiting public aid to schools teaching
religious doctrine,"1 and in 1894 this mandate was carved into the state
constitution to proscribe both direct and indirect aid to such institutions. 2
The impact of New York's Blaine Amendment would be felt in a number
of decisions that made their way through the state courts during the next half
century. In 1904 the Court of Appeals revisited the orphan asylum issue, ruling
that the state constitution does not allow the state to support institutions that
exist for sectarian purposes.2"3 In 1912 an Appellate Division Court invalidat-
199. In 1947, after New Jersey's highest court upheld bus transportation for parochial students, the
state included such a provision in its new constitution; New York and Wisconsin amended their
constitutions likewise after state courts (New York in 1938, Wisconsin in 1962) struck down such
programs on the basis of state constitutional interpretation. See id. at 96-97.
200. See generally Note, Textbook Loans to Parochial Schools, 32 BROOK. L. REV. 362 (1966);
Recent Decisions, New York State Constitution Prohibits Purchase and Loan of Textbooks to Students
of Sectarian Schools: Board of Education, East Greenbush v. Allen, 31 ALB. L. REV. 152 (1967).
201. See Act of May 7, 1844, ch. 320, § 12, 1844 N.Y. Laws 490, 492. In 1848 the legislature
passed a law that would permit orphan asylums run by the Catholic Church in Brooklyn to receive
municipal government funding. The law was subsequently struck down by the Kings County Supreme
Court on the grounds that the Catholic institutions were ineligible to qualify for funds created to support
common schools. See People v. Board of Educ., 13 Barb. 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851).
202. See supra note 176. See generally SAMUEL T. McSEvENEY, THE POLITICS OF DEPRESSION:
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR IN THE NORTHEAST, 1893-1896, at 63-86 (1972).
203. See Sargent v. Board of Educ., 64 N.E. 722 (N.Y. 1904).
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ed the practice of providing textbooks to students who attend parochial
schools. 2' Although recognizing that the aid was furnished to the students
rather than to the schools, the court held that the policy violated the Blaine
Amendment prohibition, finding that the assistance was "if not directly in aid
of the parochial schools . . . certainly . . . indirect aid."'
In 1938 the New York State Court of Appeals confronted head on the
"child benefit theory" that the Supreme Court had expounded 6 eight years
earlier, when it struck down a state statute that provided public funding for the
transportation of all elementary and secondary school children, including those
attending religious schools. In Judd v. Board of Education the Court of
Appeals found the child benefit theory to be "utterly without substance,"2'7
and went on to conclude: "Free transportation of pupils induces attendance at
the schools. The purpose of the transportation is to promote the interests of the
private school or religious or sectarian institution that controls or directs
it."208 The court held that the statute, insofar as it authorized the use of
public funds for transportation to or from any sectarian school, was "repugnant
to our fundamental law."209
The state legislature responded to Judd by amending the state constitution
to make an exception allowing transportation aid to all children in the state,
regardless of their choice of school.210 Rather than provide clarity to the legal
standard in New York, the amendment to the Blaine provision would become
a source of confusion. By focusing specifically on transportation aid as an
exception to the "indirect aid" rule, the new charter provision appeared to be
excluding all other forms of student aid. The state's highest court, however,
has read the constitution differently.
In 1967 the Court of Appeals, by a 4-3 margin, upheld a law that required
local school districts to purchase textbooks and make them available on loan
to all children in the state, including those attending nonpublic and parochial
schools.2" Here the court found that the purpose of the law in question was
204. See Smith v. Donahue, 202 A.D. 656 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922).
205. See id. at 719.
206. See Judd v. Board of Educ., 15 N.E.2d 576 (N.Y. 1938).
207. Id. at 582.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 217.
210. The new provision reads:
Neither the State nor any subdivision thereof shall use its property or credit or any public
money, or authorize or permit either to be used, directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance,
other than for examination or inspection, of any school or institution of learning wholly or in
part under the control or direction of any religious denomination, or in which any
denominational tenet or doctrine is taught, but the legislature may provide for the transporta-
tion of children to and from any school or institution of learning.
N.Y. CONST., art XI, § 3 (emphasis added).
211. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, aff'd, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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to benefit school children rather than the institutions they attend. The majority
went on to hold:
It is thus clear beyond cavil that the constitution does not demand that every
friendly gesture between church and state shall be discountenanced. The so called
'wall of separation' may be built so high and so broad as to impair both the state
and the church, as we have come to know them.
212
While some strict separationists may have feared that Allen might broaden
the aid made available to parochial school students in the state, many
accommodationists did not share that reading. As the decision was being
written, an animated battle was being fought at a constitutional convention to
repeal the Blaine Amendment once and for all.213 The repeal effort failed,
and the Blaine Amendment is still part of the New York Constitution. It is
unclear how the courts would respond to school-choice legislation that would
provide tuition relief to parents who want to send their children to religious
schools.
2. Washington
The Washington Constitution is a direct descendent of the Blaine
Amendment. Since the federal enabling act that authorized its first constitution-
al convention in 1889 mandated the adoption of strict separationist provi-
sions,214 the framers of the document complied by requiring that: "All
schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by public funds shall be
forever free from sectarian control or influence."2"5 The establishment clause
reads very much like the Blaine Amendment itself.216 Moreover, these words
set a standard for judicial decisionmaking in Washington that remains in place
today.
2 17
In 1943 a state court voided legislation that provided universal transporta-
tion for school children.21 Then in 1949, two years after the Supreme Court
in Everson219 upheld a similar program in New Jersey, a Washington court
212. Id. at 116 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 100 N.E.2d 463, 467 (1951)).
213. For an account of the proceedings, see Lewis B. Kaden, The People: No! Some Observations
on the 1967New York State Constitutional Convention, 5 HARv. J. LEo. 343 (1968); Henrik N. Dullea,
Charter Revision in The Empire State: The Politics of New York's Constitutional Convention 339-428
(1982) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs).
214. See supra note 177.
215. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 4 (1889).
216. It states: "No public money or property shall be appropriated for, or applied to any religious
worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment." WASH. CONST. art. I
§ 11 (1889, amended 1958).
217. See Frank J. Conklin & James M. Vache, The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause of the Washington Constitution-A Proposal to the Supreme Court, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv.
411, 413-18 (1985) (surveying law through 1980s).
218. See Mitchell v. Consolidated Sch. Dist. No. 201, 135 P.2d 79 (Wash. 1943).
219. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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again struck down a busing program that included parochial school children.
Addressing its differences with Everson directly, the state court said:
Although the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are entitled to the
highest considerations they bear on related questions before the court, we must, in
light of the clear provisions of our state constitution and our decisions thereunder,
respectfully disagree with those portions of the Everson majority opinion which
might be construed, in the abstract, as stating that transportation, furnished at
public expense, to children attending religious schools, is not in support of such
schools.'o
The Washington Supreme Court addressed the issue of education vouchers
directly in Weiss v. Bruno.22' The program in question provided children in
economic need with grants to attend schools of their choice including parochial
schools. The court found the program to be in violation of the state and federal
constitutions and refused to recognize the difference between direct and indirect
aid.222 It declined to concede that prohibitions against children or parents who
have a preference fbr sectarian schools might impair their free exercise rights:
"The question is not whether a student may attend a religious school, but
whether the state may subsidize that attendance. No element of coercion has
been suggested by respondents, and the free exercise clause is not involved in
these cases." 2"3
This is the same court that in Witters v. State Commission for the Blind'
later denied a scholarship to a blind student who wanted to attend a bible
college. In addition to rejecting the aid on state constitutional grounds, the
court in this case found that the program in question violated the Lemon test.
The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately overturned the Washington court's
decision.225
3. Massachusetts
Although Massachusetts has never had a voucher program in operation
involving sectarian schools, the wording of its constitution and opinions
rendered by its courts on bills being considered by the state legislature indicate
that it would not be receptive to the idea. The constitution prohibits direct aid
to religious schools and institutions,2 but it also specifically allows higher
220. Visser v. Nooksack Valley Sch. Dist. No. 506, 207 P.2d 198, 205 (Wash. 1949).
221. Weiss v. Bruno, 509 P.2d 973 (Wash. 1973).
222. "A direct financial grant which enables a needy student to pay tuition and thereby remain in
private school obviously supports the school." Id. at 978.
223. Id.
224. Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989).
225. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Soc. Servs., 474 U.S. 263 (1986).
226. No grant, appropriation or the use of public money or property or loan of credit shall be
made or authorized by the Commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof for the purpose
of founding, maintaining or aiding any infirmary, hospital, institution, primary or secondary
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education grants to private colleges or students,2 27 and the direct support of
health organizations serving certain handicapped populations.228
Even a permissive reading of the constitution in the state where the idea of
the common school took shape 2 9 indicates a strong disinclination to provide
support for nonpublic schools. Whether such proscriptions would include aid
to students or parents to offset tuition costs has been the subject of judicial
scrutiny on several occasions. In 1970 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts unanimously opined that a bill to appropriate $100 to each
public and private school student in the state to defray a portion of education
expenses would violate the state constitution."O Because parents would have
simply signed over a voucher to the schools their children attended, the path
of indirect aid to the school rather than the parents was rather clear.
The high court of Massachusetts later considered another bill befbre the
state legislature, this one involving a tax deduction program modeled after the
Minnesota statute, which the Court approved in Mueller v. Allen. 1 Here the
court, ruling on the basis of the state constitution, rejected the distinction
between direct and indirect aid, arguing: "If aid has been channeled to the
student rather than to the private school, the fbcus still is on the effect of the
aid, not on the recipient."
2
4. Pennsylvania
School choice has been an active item on the political agenda in Pennsylva-
nia since 1991, and current Governor Tom Ridge has pledged to continue
school, or charitable or religious undertaking which is not publicly owned and under the
exclusive control order and supervision of public officers or public agents authorized by the
Commonwealth or federal authority or both.
MASS. CONST. art CM, § 2.
227. "Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the Commonwealth from making
grants-in-aid to private higher education institutions or to students or parents or guardians of students
attending such institutions." Id.
228. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the Commonwealth, or any
political subdivision thereof, from paying to privately controlled hospitals, infirmaries, or
institutions for the deaf, dumb, or blind not more than the ordinary and reasonable
compensation for the care or support actually rendered .... or institutions to such persons as
may be in whole or in part unable to support or care for themselves.
MASS. CONST. art Xvim, § 3.
229. See JORGENSON, supra note 60, at 159-86.
230. Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 259 N.E.2d 564 (Mass. 1970). In its
opinion, the court discussed its earlier advice that the purchase of secular education services from
parochial schools was a form of constitutionally prohibited public aid. See id. at 566.
231. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
232. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 514 N.E.2d 353, 356 (Mass. 1987). In 1992 the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire also issued an advisory opinion to the state legislature indicating that
a proposed program to reimburse a portion of the tuition for students in private and parochial schools
would violate the portion of the state constitution that prohibits payment "towards the support of the
schools of any sect or denomination." Opinion of the Justices (Choice in Education), 616 A.2d 478, 480
(N.H. 1992) (citing N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 6).
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supporting it until a bill emerges from the state legislature.23 The Pennsylva-
nia courts have never had an opportunity to consider the question, so any
thoughts about how the courts would resolve the issue would be purely
speculative. Pennsylvania's constitution, like that of most states, prohibits
direct aid to sectarian institutions.2" Like the Massachusetts Constitution,
however, the Pennsylvania Constitution distinguishes between higher education
and elementary and secondary education." The courts in the state have
given legal significance to the difference between direct aid and indirect aid,
but with a caveat.
In Rhodes v. School District of Abington Township236 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court upheld the busing of parochial school children on the grounds
that the program being supported by the state had no religious significance.
237
The Supreme Court denied certiorari.238 In a subsequent case the Pennsylva-
nia high court again validated a transportation program that included parochial
school students.239 While the court acknowledged the "indirect and inciden-
tal" benefits accrued by the private institutions, it ruled that: "the limitations
provided in Article III, Sections 15 and 29 apply only when state funds flow
to the sectarian school or institution."'
Opponents of school choice point to the factual differences between the case
where "no state monies reach the coffers of these church-affiliated
schools,""' and the case of vouchers, where funds ultimately would reach
schools, arguing that only the latter would violate the state constitution.4 2 In
the meantime supporters of choice legislation in the state legislature have
proposed amending the state constitution so that scholarship aid is no longer
designated permissible only with regard to higher education. 3
233. See Conn., Pa. Governors Renew Push for Vouchers, EDUC. WK., Nov. 15, 1995, at 22.
234. "No money raised for the support of the public schools of the Commonwealth shall be
appropriated to or used for the support of any sectarian school." PA. CONST. art. Ill, § 15.
235.
No appropriation shall be made for charitable, educational or benevolent purposes to any
person or community nor to any denominational and sectarian institution, corporation or
association: Provided, That appropriations may be made ... in the form of scholarship grants
or loans for higher educational purposes to residents of the Commonwealth enrolled in
institutions ofhigher learning except that no scholarship, grants or loans for higher educational
purposes shall be given to persons enrolled in a theological seminary or school of theology.
PA. CONST. art. E9, § 29. It is important to note the controlling distinction here between secular
institutions that offer general educational programs and theological seminaries that train people for the
ministry.
236. 226 A.2d 53 (Pa. 1967).
237. See id. at 64.
238. See Worrell v. Matters, 389 U.S. 846 (1967) (mem.).
239. See Springfield Sch. Dist. v. Department of Educ., 397 A.2d 1154 (Pa. 1979).
240. Id. at 1168, 1171.
241. Id. at 1171.
242. See John P. Jones, Pennsylvania's Choice: "School Choice" and the Pennsylvania
Constitution, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 1289, 1304 (1993).
243. See id. at 1302-03.
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5. Wisconsin
The Milwaukee Choice Program, currently being litigated in state court,
was the first in recent history to provide economically disadvantaged children
with an opportunity to attend private or parochial schools at public ex-
pense.' The original choice plan enacted by the Wisconsin Legislature in
1990 had been restricted to "nonsectarian" private schools in the City of
Milwaukee. 45 Under this plan the state paid a tuition credit directly to
schools attended by eligible students. This version of the program sustained
two legal challenges. It was first challenged in state court on the grounds that
it violated a provision of the Wisconsin Constitution requiring the creation of
a "unifbrm" system of schools.2 6 The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld its
constitutionality under the "public purpose doctrine," finding that it was a
limited experiment designed to improve the educational opportunities of
disadvantaged children. 7
In 1993 the Landmark Legal Foundation, in federal court, challenged the
exclusion of parochial schools from the program as an abridgement of their
free exercise rights under the First Amendment and of their equal protection
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 The district court rejected these
claims, fbcusing particularly on the method of payment of the program which
allots funds directly to the school. 9 In 1995 the Wisconsin legislature, at the
244. Vermont also has a school choice program which requires local school districts without high
schools to pay tuition for students to attend either an approved private school or a public high school
of choice in another district up to an amount equal to the state average of per pupil spending. In 1994
the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that tuition reimbursement for a child to attend a sectarian school of
choice outside the state did not violate either the state or the Federal Constitution. See Campbell v.
Manchester Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 641 A.2d 352 (Vt. 1994). In August 1997 a local school board sued the
Vermont Department of Education when the Department refused to reimburse the board for tuition paid
at a local Catholic high school. See Mark Walsh, Vt. District Provides Latest Test in Battle over
Religious Vouchers, EDUC. WK., Sept. 18, 1996, at 16.
245. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(2)(a). For case histories of the Wisconsin choice program, see
DANIEL McGROARTY, BREAK THESE CHAINS: THE BATTLE FOR SCHOOL CHOICE (1996); Paul E.
Peterson & Chad Noyes, School Choice in Milwaukee, in NEW SCHOOLS FOR A NEW CENTURY: THE
REDESIGN OF URBAN EDUCATION (Diane Ravitch & Joseph Viteritti eds., forthcoming 1997).
246. See Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Wis. 1992) The Wisconsin Constitution requires
that "[tihe legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools, which shall be as
nearly uniform as practicable." Wis. CONST. art. X, § 3. The statute was also challenged on the basis
that it was a private law, but this claim was also rejected by the court. See 480 N.W.2d at 462.
247. The court ruled: "Sufficient safeguards are included in the program to ensure that participating
private schools are under adequate governmental supervision reasonably necessary under the
circumstances to attain the public purpose of improving educational quality." 480 N.W.2d at 463. See
also James B. Egle, The Constitutional Implications of School Choice, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 459, 501-09
(discussing Wisconsin's uniformity clause challenge).
248. See First Amended Complaint, Miller v. Benson, 878 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D.Wis. 1995) (No.
93-C-1063).
249. "The present state of First Amendment law compels this court to hold that the plaintiffs'
request to expand the current Choice Program to make tuition reimbursements directly payable to
religious private schools who admit eligible Choice Program school-children would violate the
Establishment Clause." 878 F. Supp. at 1209, 1216.
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urging of Governor Tommy Thompson, amended the law to provide that
vouchers be paid directly to parents rather than the schools, and to eliminate
the restriction against religious institutions.' °
Plaintiffs in the current case 1 claim that the program, in its present
form, offends the Wisconsin constitution, which prohibits drawing money from
the state treasury to benefit a religious organization or compelling anyone to
support a place of worship. 2 They argue that the Wisconsin Constitution
imposes stricter standards of separation than the First Amendment.253 For
instance, the Wisconsin Supreme Court invalidated a statute requiring school
districts to provide bus service for students in parochial schools, 2" despite
the Supreme Court's decision in Everson 5 permitting a similar practice in
New Jersey. The state court held that the federal Establishment Clause "lends
itself to more flexibility of interpretation" than the Wisconsin Constitution.256
Subsequent case law, however, paints another picture of the Wisconsin
legal landscape. In 1974, in the wake of the Lemon ruling, 257 a state court
upheld a law providing for the procurement of special education services from
private and sectarian organizations, ruling: "[C]ontracting for goods or services
for a public purpose with a sectarian institution is appropriate state action. It
is only when such a contract has a primary effect of advancing a religion that
the constitutional prohibitions come into effect."" The court concluded that
"the primary effect" of this statute is "the providing of special education
services to the handicapped children of Wisconsin, a secular purpose."259
More recently the Wisconsin high court has tended to follow the evolving
standards of the Supreme Court in interpreting its own constitution, explaining,
"[W]e interpret and apply Art 1, sec. 18 [of the Wisconsin Constitution] in
light of United States Supreme Court cases interpreting the Establishment
Clause. "26
250. See 1995 Wis. Legis. Serv. Act 27, sec. 4004 § 119.23(4) (West).
251. Thompson v. Jackson, No. 95-2153-OA, L.C. #s 95CV1982 and 95CV1997 (Wis. Aug. 25,
1995).
252. "[Njor shall any person be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship....
nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or
theological seminaries." Wis. CONST. art I, § 18.
253. See Brief for Respondents at 14, 22, Thompson v. Jackson, No. 95-2153-OA, L.C. #s
95CV1982 and 95CV1997 (Wis. Aug. 25, 1995) (arguing that Wisconsin courts apply state
establishment clause "independently and more strictly than its federal counterpart").
254. See State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 115 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1962).
255. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
256. 115 N.W.2d at 769-70. The effect of this decision on the busing of parochial school students
was soon reversed by an amendment to the state constitution. See Wis. CONST. art. I, § 23.
257. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
258. State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 219 N.W.2d 577, 583 (Wis. 1974) (footnote omitted).
259. Id. at 585.
260. King v. Village of Waunakee, 517 N.W.2d 671, 683 (Wis. 1994) (quoting lower court). See
also Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Thompson, 476 N.W.2d 318,320-21 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991)
(looking to Supreme Court rubric in interpreting establishment clause of Wisconsin constitution).
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Wisconsin may now be a state in which strict separationists will receive
support for their pleas neither at the federal nor state level. Their legal
strategy-to initiate litigation in the state rather than the federal courts-may
reveal a recognition on their part, however, that the federal judiciary is moving
more rapidly towards a sympathetic position on school choice than their state
counterparts, even in a jurisdiction such as Wisconsin where the political and
judicial climate has been sensitive to religious interests.
On March 29, 1996, an equally divided court (one justice having recused
herself) returned the case to trial at the Dane County Circuit Court.26' By the
time the case makes its way back to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Chief
Justice Roland B. Day, who voted against the Choice Program on the grounds
that it violated the state constitution, will have retired. His replacement on the
bench will be N. Patrick Crooks, who is philosophically aligned with Governor
Thompson and is considered more likely to support the Choice Program.262
6. Puerto Rico
In 1993 the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico enacted the Special Scholarship
and School Choice Act.2" Tied to major reforms within the public school
system, the comprehensive school choice program entitled families with an
income of $18,000 or less to a voucher worth $1,500 that they could use either
in a public, private, or parochial school.26 By the 1994-95 school year
16,899 students had opted to participate in the program. In November 1994,
the Commonwealth Supreme Court halted the portion of the program that
allowed children to attend private or parochial schools at public expense. The
court ruled that these provisions violated the Commonwealth Constitution,
which outlaws the use of tax monies to support nonpublic schools.2"
Here was a situation in which the scholarship voucher generated a payment
of funds directly to the schools, thereby establishing a practice that would have
been questionable even under existing federal standards. Nevertheless, this
court unambiguously claimed that it was not being governed by federal
standards in its decision. Writing for the majority, Justice Hernandez Denton
rejected outright the proposition that the Commonwealth's constitution "mirrors
261. See Thompson v. Jackson, 546 N.W.2d 140 (Wis. 1996) (per curiam).
262. See Mark Walsh, Coun Deadlocks on Religious-School Vouchers, EDuc. WEEK, Apr. 10,
1996, at 5.
263. See Law 71.
264. See AHEAD OF THE LEARNING CURVE, EMPOWERING TEACHERS, STUDENTS AND PARENTS:
How PUERTO RICO IS REFORMING PUBuC EDUCATION, OFFICE OF THE ADVISOR TO THE GOVERNOR
ON EDUC. AFFAIRS, January, 1994 [hereinafter AHEAD OF THE LEARNINO CURVE].
265. "No public property or public funds shall be used for the support of schools or educational
institutions other than those of the state." P.R. CONST. art. II, § 5.
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the First Amendment's Establishment Clause as interpreted by the U.S.
Supreme Court."" c He explained further:
Section 5 prohibits the state from providing any benefits, assistance or support to
private schools. Of course, indirect and incidental public benefits that accrue to
private schools are not prohibited (e.g., fire and police protection), for they are
available to all citizens. But a private school is prohibited from receiving public
services or assistance that support its educational mission.w
The court denied the possibility of separating the secular aspect of a
parochial school's curriculum from its overall religious mission. In a bold
move to define its own standards of separation differently than those enunciated
by the United States Supreme Court, it cited as authority the Washington State
Supreme Court's decision in Weiss v. Bruno26 (already rejected by the U.S.
Supreme Court), which also struck down a voucher system.2"
Of particular interest here, however, is the dissenting opinion filed by
Justice Negron Garcia,270 who approached the issue from the perspective of
the liberty and equality rights of poor parents and accused the majority of
perpetuating a stratified system of education:
The essence of the constitutional right to an education, as a precondition of liberty,
is the right to choose within a pluralistic system of possibilities. By forcing poor
students to public schools, we are saying that private education is only for the well-
off; we deprive them of the possibility to educate their children."
Justice Garcia's opinion is significant for at least two reasons. First, it
expresses an appreciation for the religious pluralism embraced by the Rehnquist
Court-a theme that will undoubtedly be heard in future Court decisions.
Second, by introducing liberty and equality concerns, it has identified the
context for future constitutional deliberations about school choice and plausibly
a just resolution to the ongoing debate.
266. Teachers Ass'n v. Torres, Dkt. No. KAC-93-1268 (1003) (1994).
267. Id.
268. Weiss v. Bruno, 509 P.2d 973 (Wash. 1973) (en banc).
269. In a concurring opinion, Justice Alonso asserted that the voucher program would "siphon off"
the best students and needed tax dollars from the financially strapped public schools: "It is difficult to
conceive of a more urgent and important government duty than to address the root causes of our
educational difficulties. Part of this task must be to devote as many resources as possible to public
education without diverting educational funds to inappropriate governmental activities." Torres.
270. Another dissenting opinion was offered by Justice Robello Lopez, who disagreed with the
majority's strict interpretation of the Commonwealth Constitution: "The term 'support' in section five
does not prohibit or obstruct the government from providing funds or vouchers to children to attend
private schools, even if they are religious. What is prohibited by section five is that the government
substitute private education for the public school system." Id.
271. Id.
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7. Summary Comments
A review of the case law in just a small sampling of states reveals the
variety of standards that are applied in interpreting the First Amendment and
its relationship to state constitutional law. The courts in Wisconsin and
Pennsylvania, for example, appear to be sympathetic to the direction in which
the Supreme Court is moving, yet it remains to be seen how these state courts
would rule on the issue of school choice. New York has exhibited a similar
leaning, although it continues to enshrine the Blaine Amendment within its
constitution as if it were a symbol of religious freedom. The courts in
Washington, Massachusetts, and Puerto Rico are less ambiguous about their
intent to adopt their own standards and flout the rulings of the Court; such
cases point to a serious constitutional dilemma calling for a remedy by the
federal judiciary under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
Diversity is expected under our system of judicial federalism. It is
problematic, however, when state courts impose limitations on the free exercise
of religion that transgress constitutional guidelines set down by the Court. Our
system of federalism permits states to define state rights more broadly than
analogous federal rights but not to abridge those liberties that are protected by
the Constitution. Judicial activism at the state level is a welcome phenomenon
only to the extent that it makes for a freer society. By erecting a higher wall
of separation between church and state, jurisdictions like Washington,
Massachusetts, and Puerto Rico are actually treading on the free exercise rights
of individuals, which the Supreme Court has decided are guaranteed by the
First Amendment. Furthermore, in the context of school choice, such
transgressions not only jeopardize First Amendment protections but also
infringe on the equal educational opportunity to which all people are entitled.
III. EQUALITY, CHOICE, AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
A. Defining Equality: Brown's Legacy
Brown v. Board of Education272 was the most important Supreme Court
decision of the twentieth century. It was the means by which the Warren Court
embraced the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for promoting racial
equality in the states,2 73 and it set the stage for a political agenda in Congress
272. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). There is a voluminous literature on the
Brown decision and its effects. One of the most detailed treatments of the case is RICHARD KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE
FOR EQUALITY (1975).
273. Brown sparked a series of decisions that dealt with various forms of racial segregation. See,
e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam) (public
parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (buses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879
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that brought about a civil rights revolution."7 Brown, unlike any judicial
proclamation before or since, perceptively explained the central role that
education plays in a free society-as a source of civic virtue, as a means of
acculturation, as a vehicle for social mobility, and, ultimately, as a guarantor
of full equality. 27 Under its mandate, a decent education is nothing less than
a right to which all were entitled. Brown articulated a set of ideals in education
that would seem to be rooted in the soul of a free people-desegregation of the
races and equal opportunity for all. Forty years later, public schooling in
America has achieved neither.
1. Judicial Activism
The immediate impact of the Brown decision was to supersede the "separate
but equal" doctrine that stood for more than a half-century as a result of Plessy
v. Ferguson.276 A unanimous Court in Brown rejected de jure segregation
outright by declaring "separate [is] inherently unequal." 2' Based upon social
science evidence submitted by Kenneth Clark and others,2 8 the Court
accepted the idea that the separation of students on the basis of skin color is
psychologically damaging to black children and "generates a feeling of
inferiority."279 While the "all deliberate speed" principle announced in Brown
(per curiam) (1955) (golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam)
(beaches).
274. For a critical history of the changing federal role in education after Brown, see DIANE
RAVITCH, THE TROUBLED CRUSADE 114-82 (1983) [hereinafter THE TROUBLED CRUSADE].
275. The Court stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate
our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society.... It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
276. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). For an analysis of the case, see CHARLES A.
LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION (1987). William Nelson gives
considerable attention to the Plessy decision in his probing history of the Fourteenth Amendment, where
he describes it as one of the most pivotal yet misunderstood episodes in our judicial experience. See
NELSON, supra note 157, at 185. He argues that while the Supreme Court at the time had bowed to
segregation in order to protect state prerogatives under federalism as it was then understood, the Court
had also evidenced a commitment to equality of educational opportunity under that separatism. See id.
He points out that three years after Plessy, the Court had indicated that it would not sanction an action
by a local school board creating an institution for whites without creating a comparable one for blacks,
if the determination was made out of "hostility to the colored population because of their race." Id. at
187 (citing Cummings v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899)).
277. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
278. Id. at 494 n.l. These assertions have been a source of great debate within the social science
community. See, e.g., THE COURTS, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (Betsy Levin &
Willis D. Hawley eds., 1977).
279. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
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I/'" in 1955 left an initial impression that the Court would move cautiously
in implementing desegregation, subsequent decisions proved otherwise.28 If
there ever were an assault on the original federalist structure balancing national
and state power, it occurred during the next two decades as the federal courts
became intimately involved in elementary and secondary education."s Until
then, schooling had been almost exclusively within the province of state and
local control.
In a 1973 desegregation case involving Denver, Colorado, the Court raised
the stakes on the racial balancing question further, when it ruled that states that
had not historically maintained dual school systems defined by race could be
required under certain circumstances to take affirmative action to integrate. 2H
And in 1976 Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 6-2 majority, delivered an opinion
that reversed two lower court decisions, allowing the Pasadena Board of
Education to adopt its own voluntary integration plan, freeing it from four
280. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
281. Beginning in 1968, the Court moved from its original desegregation strategy to enforcing a
policy of affirmative integration. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968)
(ruling that school districts with history of de jure segregation were "charged with the affirmative duty
to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system"). Three years later, the Court
expanded Green and allowed a limited policy of quotas in student assignments. See Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971). The Court also held that remedies imposed in such
cases must fit the violations, thereby setting limits on lower court action. See id. at 16.
Contrary to the principle of racial neutrality that had been enshrined in Brown, the Court began to
use racial classifications as criteria for deliberate governmental action. See Joseph P. Viteritti,
Unapportioned Justice: Local Elections, Social Science and the Evolution of the Voting Rights Act, 4
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 199 (1994) (discussing use of racial criteria for apportionment of election
districts). The Court's aggressive posture on the question of school integration produced one of the most
controversial public policies in the history of the nation, involuntary busing to achieve racial balance.
For two well-argued but divergent commentaries on busing, see LINO GRALIA, DISASTER BY DECREE:
THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS (1976) (opposing busing); GARY
ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus: SEGREGATED SCHOOLS AND NATIONAL POLICY (1978) (supporting busing).
282. For an overview of the case law, see EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW, supra note 6, at 38-77.
283. See Keys v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189, 203 (1973) (ruling that finding of intentional
segregative policy in portion of school district could be grounds for presuming intentional segregation
in entire district).
There was a measure of moderation that seemed to be taking hold on the Court even in the Denver
decision, however. As desegregation litigation began to work its way north, the Court for the first time
imposed an "intent" standard that would require plaintiffs to demonstrate that segregation was a product
of purposeful governmental action, endowing the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation
with legal significance. Id. at 208. A year later, with Chief Justice Burger writing the majority opinion
in a 5-4 ruling, the Supreme Court refused to endorse an interdistrict integration plan involving 54
school districts surrounding Detroit because it could not be demonstrated that the suburban jurisdictions
had a hand in producing racial isolation in the city. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974).
In Milliken, the Court found no interdistrict remedy was required "[w]ith no showing of significant
violation by the 53 outlying school districts and no evidence of any interdistrict violation or effect." Id.
One year earlier, the Court, in a one-sentence opinion, struck down Richmond, Virginia's interdistrict
busing plan. Bradley v. State Bd. of Educ., 411 U.S. 913 (1973) (per curiam).
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years of judicial supervision.2" The Pasadena decision presaged the jurispru-
dence of the Rehnquist Court.2"
Brown and its judicial progeny not only invalidated, but also virtually
eliminated de jure segregation in the United States. Given the preponderance
of dual systems that existed prior to 1954, it was a monumental achievement.
Today seventy percent of school districts with enrollments above 27,000, and
forty percent of districts with enrollments above 10,000 have implemented
some form of desegregation program.2"6 These jurisdictions include three-
fourths of the black and Hispanic school-children in the nation.2"
But if school desegregation has succeeded in America, racial integration in
elementary and secondary education has proven to be a measured failure. In his
comprehensive review of the existing data, David Armor found that while
black-white imbalance improved substantially between 1968 and 1989,28
there was only a slight improvement in the degree to which minority and white
students were actually exposed to each other in a school setting.29 Although
the racial profile of individual schools now more closely resembles the
composition of their respective districts, the opportunity for minority and white
students to attend school together has actually improved only minimally."w
The most persuasive, though controversial, explanation for the
resegregation phenomenon is known as "white flight." 291 Between 1968 and
284. Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 429 (1976).
285. In 1991, the Court ruled in an Oklahoma City case that judicial supervision of desegregation
is only a temporary measure and could be terminated if a school district shows a good faith effort to
comply with the law and eliminates the vestiges of past discrimination "to the extent practicable." Board
of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991); see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 496 (1992)
(holding unanimously that suburban district in Georgia not responsible for correcting racial imbalance
resulting purely from demographic factors). Most recently, in 1995, the Supreme Court ruled in a
longstanding Kansas City case that student performance could not be used as a measure for determining
whether a school district has achieved unitary status. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2055
(1995).
286. See DAVID ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAw 166 (1995).
287. This amounts to 6.8 million out of a total of 9.1 million. See id.
288. Using a "dissimilarity index" that measures profiles of individual schools against the profile
of the districts in which they reside, Armor found changes from 67 % in 1968, to 51% in 1972, to 43 %
in 1980, where it has remained constant. For Hispanics, for whom segregation was a less severe
problem in the post-Brown era, the dissimilarity index changed from 53% in 1968, to 42% in 1972, to
40% in 1980, where it has remained constant. See id. at 171.
289. Exposure rates measure the degree to which students actually attend school with students of
another race. For black students, exposure rates fluctuated from 43 % in 1968, to 54% in 1972, to 47%
in 1989. For Hispanics, it changed from 70% in 1978 to 51% in 1989. See id. at 172-73.
290. Using other data, Gary Orfield and his colleagues have come to somewhat different-,
conclusions in studying desegregation trends for the same period. They, too, found that the most
progress occurred between 1968 and 1972; however, they also identified a more significant problem
emerging with Hispanic segregation. See GARY ORFIELD & FRANKLIN MONFORT, COUNCIL OF URBAN
BDS. oF EDUC., STATUS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: THE NEXT GENERATION (1992); GARY ORFIELD
ET AL., COUNCIL OF URBAN BDS. OF EDUC. & NATIONAL SCH. DESEGREGATION RESEARCH PRojECT,
STATUS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, 1968-1986 (1989).
291. Among the early studies on the subject are JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., TRENDS IN SCHOOL
SEGREGATION, 1968-1973 (1975) [hereinafter TRENDS IN SCHOOL SEGREGATION]; and REYNOLDS
FARLEY & C. WURDUCK, POPULATIONS STUDIES CTR. OF THE UNIV. OF MICH., CAN GOVERNMENTAL
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1979 the proportion of white students enrolled in large public school systems
declined from seventy-three percent to fifty-two percent. 29 Therefore, even
though individual schools within these systems are now more representative of
the general school population, there is less intermingling of the races. Great
disagreement exists among social scientists regarding the degree to which
integration efforts, and especially busing, contributed to white flight.2" We
need not resolve that issue in this study, however. The important lesson to be
drawn here is that de facto segregation continues to exist in most large school
systems. That point is incontrovertible.
2. Congressional Initiatives: Fiscal Federalism and Educational
Opportunity
Brown stimulated political and legislative action that would more
completely define the equal education opportunity standard articulated in the
original decision.29 If aggressive action by the federal judiciary were not
sufficient to redefine the role of the national government in education, the
generous but conditional infusion of federal funds certainly would complete the
task. As a result of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA),295
federal spending in education increased from one billion to two billion dollars
between 1965 and 1966, and to nearly three billion dollars by the end of the
decade .2' ESEA was a cornerstone of President Lyndon Johnson's Great
Society Program and his "War on Poverty." Under Titles I and II of ESEA,
POLICIES INTEGRATE PUBLIC SCHOOLS? (1977).
292. ARMOR, supra note 286, at 170.
293. Using a multiple regression model, Armor offers persuasive evidence of the causal relationship
between desegregation and white flight. See id. at 186; see also CHRISTINE ROSSELL, THE CARROT OR
THE STICK FOR DESEGREGATION POLICY (1990) [hereinafter THE CARROT OR STICK]; FINIS WELCH &
AUDREY LIGHT, NEW EVIDENCE ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights No. 92,
1987); Franklin D. Wilson, The Impact of School Desegregation Programs on White Public-School
Enrollment, 1968-1976, 58 Soc. OF EDUC. 137 (1985).
294. For an overview of the legislative history, see EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW, supra note
6, at 56-69.
In 1957 Congress passed the first major civil rights act since Reconstruction, 42 U.S.C. § 1975,
which created the United States Civil Rights Commission. The Justice Department instituted a newly
empowered Civil Rights Division, see Att'y Gen. Order No. 155-57 (Dec. 9, 1957). In 1964 Congress
enacted the most far-reaching civil rights act of the century. 42 U.S.C. § 1981-2000. See GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 42-71, 157-69 (1991)
(arguing that significant school desegregation in South did not occur until passage of this act). Title IV
of the Act authorized the Attorney General to initiate desegregation suits and appropriated grants to state
and local governments to support desegregation efforts. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1995). Title VI denied
federal assistance to any school district engaged in racial discrimination. See id. § 2000d-1 (1995). The
significance of the latter stipulation would become more apparent over the next year, when federal
dollars became part of the national strategy to promote equal opportunity in education.
295. Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89-10 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). See STEPHEN K. BAILEY & EDITH K. MOSHER, ESEA: THE OFFICE
OF EDUCATION ADMIINISTERS A LAW 37-71 (1968) (on legislative history of ESEA).
296. See P. Michael Timpane, Federal Aid to Schools, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 491, 495
(1974).
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funds were directed to children specifically on the basis of socioeconomic
need.2" Implicit in the design was a new federal approach to educational
equality, which would go beyond racial desegregation and commit financial
resources for improving the educational achievement of disadvantaged
populations.
The ESEA legislation explicitly provided that children attending private and
parochial schools would not be excluded from eligibility.29 Although funds
would be administered through the public schools, educationally and
economically deprived students attending nonpublic schools would be permitted
to participate through audio-visual devices, television and radio programs,
mobile teaching units, and dual-enrollment programs. 2" No part of the funds,
however, could flow directly to nonpublic schools or be used to compensate
their teachers. ESEA very consciously represented a legislative enactment of
the "child benefit theory." Children in need would be permitted to receive
benefits from the program regardless of which schools they attended, whether
public, private, or parochial. The concept was adopted both to address the
needs of disadvantaged populations and to accommodate First Amendment
considerations of separation.' Nevertheless, the administration of the
program was significantly altered in 1985 when the Court ruled that public
school districts could not send their teachers into parochial schools to provide
secular instruction.3"'
297. In recognition of the special educational needs of children of low-income families and the
impact that concentrations of low-income families have on the ability of local educational
agencies to support adequate educational programs, the Congress hereby declares it to be the
policy of the United States to provide financial assistance . .. to local educational agencies
serving areas with concentrations of children from low-income families to expand and improve
their educational programs by various means.. . which contribute particularly to meeting the
special educational needs of educationally deprived children.
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, § 201, 79 Stat. 27 (repealed 1978).
298. See 79 Stat. 30, 20 U.S.C.A. § 241e(a)(2) (West 1990) (repealed 1978).
299. Prior to the passage of ESEA, federal assistance was provided to sectarian institutions through
the GI Bill, the National Defense Education Act, the National Science Foundation Act, college housing
loans, the National School Lunch Act, and the Hill-Burton Hospital Reconstruction Act. See BAILEY &
MOSHER, supra note 295, at 33. For a review of postwar educational initiatives by the federal
government, see THE TROUBLED CRUSADE, supra note 274, at 3-42.
300. See EUGENE EIDENBERG & RoY D. MOREY, AN ACT OF CONGRESS: THE LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS AND THE MAKING OF EDUCATION POLICY 75-95 (1969).
301. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). This decision barred New York and other
districts from sending public school teachers into parochial schools, requiring school districts to rent
additional space to deliver services. In New York City, where the decision is about to be challenged,
the extra costs amount to $16 million per year. The current challenge has the support of the U.S.
Secretary of Education and, given the present composition of the Supreme Court, is expected to succeed.
See Joseph Berger, Limit on Remedial Education is Appealed, N.Y. TuIES, Aug. 31, 1996, at 25; Mark
Walsh, N.Y.C. Seeks to Overturn Limits on Title l at Religious Schools, EDUC. WK., Feb. 28, 1996,
at 1, 12.
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In 1972, shortly after the Court approved busing as a remedy fbr racial
integration," 2 the Emergency School Aid Act was passed.30 3 While the law
appropriated federal funds to assist school systems implement desegregation
plans, congressional debate on the bill reflected a growing public sentiment
against busing. Two years later the Equal Educational Opportunities Act
was signed into law, declaring that all school children "are entitled to equal
educational opportunity without regard to race, color, sex, or national
origin. 305 This time, Congress and the President wanted to communicate that
equal educational opportunity does not necessarily include extraordinary
governmental action to mix students by race. The Act clearly stated that a
failure to achieve racial balance was not necessarily illegal.30 6 The Act also
specifically prohibited the federal courts from imposing busing as a remedy for
segregation unless less intrusive alternative approaches had proven to be
ineffective.307
The legislative die had now been cast against busing. Between 1974 and
1980 it became commonplace to amend education appropriations bills in order
to reject the policy of transporting children great distances in order to
accomplish a racial agenda. This legislative practice was upheld by the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.30 ' The Supreme Court itself had
already indicated that it was prepared to take a more moderate approach to
integration, as evident from decisions concerning Detroit3 9 and Pasade-
na.310 After social science research introduced the concept of "white flight"
to the dialogue on desegregation, voluntary choice and magnet school programs
became increasingly popular. One of the first such plans was implemented with
court approval in the city of Milwaukee in 1979."'
3. Separate and Unequal
American justice would no longer tolerate public policy at the national,
state, or local levels that would intentionally separate school children on the
basis of race. But there was a practical limit to what policy makers and judges
could do to effectuate integration. In James Coleman's controversial assessment
302. See Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
303. 20 U.S.C. § 1601-19 (1972) (repealed 1978).
304. 20 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994).
305. Id.
306. See 20 U.S.C. § 1704 (1994).
307. See 20 U.S.C. § 1755 (1994). Among those remedies deemed acceptable in the new law were
magnet schools and the revision of attendance zones. The law was resolute in prescribing "the
neighborhood is the appropriate basis for determining public school assignments." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1701(a)(2) (1994).
308. See Brown v. Califano, 627 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cit. 1980).
309. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
310. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
311. See Armstrong v. Board ofSch. Dirs., 471 F. Supp. 800 (1979).
Vol. 15:113, 1996
Religious Freedom and Educational Opportunity
of educational opportunity in America in 1966,312 he documented that black
and white children attend separate schools, a fact that social scientists like
David Armor have shown is true today.3" The Coleman report's most lasting
impact is that it introduced the factors of resources and achievement as critical
issues for consideration, thus advancing the discussion on educational equality
beyond race.3 14 Notwithstanding Coleman's own conclusions,315 a contem-
porary examination of the factors he underscored three decades ago demon-
strates rather persuasively that minority children attend schools that are both
separate and unequal and that this evident inequality bears significant
consequences with regard to educational achievement.
a. Resources. Despite the massive infusion of federal dollars into education,
school finance remains primarily a matter of state and local concern. In 1994
only seven percent of all primary and secondary school revenues were derived
from federal sources.316 The distribution of educational resources is generally
determined by local decision makers guided by complex fbrmulas that are
written by state legislatures.317 By the late 1960s a substantial research
literature had begun to emerge showing disparities in spending between
property-rich school districts and poor districts, leading to calls for reform.3"'
In 1971 the California Supreme Court invalidated the state school finance
formula because it discriminated against the poor and thereby violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.31 9 It seemed like a
reasonable interpretation of the U.S. Constitution in the wake of Brown, which
312. See JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966)
[hereinafter EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY].
313. See ARMOR, supra note 286.
314. See James S. Coleman, The Concept ofEqualty of Educational Opportunity, 38 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 7 (1968).
315. Coleman found resource allocations between racially defined groups to be similar, and
concluded that neither race nor resources were directly related to achievement. He identified family
background as the critical variable in determining educational outcomes, an assertion that led to much
debate among social scientists. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER JENCKS ET AL., INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT
OF THE EFFECT OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA (1972) ("Unless a society completely
eliminates ties between parents and children, inequality among parents guarantees some degree of
inequality in the opportunities available to children."); ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
(Frederick Mosteller & Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., 1972) (papers deriving from Harvard University
Faculty seminar on the Coleman report).
316. Even at its peak in 1980, only 9.8% of all education dollars were derived from the federal
government. See Allen Odden et al., The Story of the Education Dollar, PHI DELTA KAPPAN (1995).
317. See WALTER GARMS ET AL., SCHOOL FINANCE: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION (1978).
318. Two of the early and influential works were ARTHUR WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS:
THE PROMISE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1968); JOHN COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH
AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970).
319. See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584 (1971).
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had deemed educational equality a fundamental right.3 Serrano sped the
hopes of reformers throughout the nation. Yet, it was a short-lived victory.
Two years later in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez, 321 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the argument that the Fourteenth
Amendment provided grounds to strike down the school finance system of
Texas. The Court reasoned that "the Equal Protection Clause does not require
absolute equality or precisely equal advantages."32 2 In reaching its conclusion
the Court noted "the absence of any evidence that the financing system
discriminates against a definable category of 'poor people."' 3 3 Demonstrat-
ing the Court's growing reluctance to intrude into local affairs, Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, observed that "every claim arising under the Equal
Protection Clause has implications for the relationship between national and
state power under our federal system."32
Even though the Court left the door open for factual proof of discrimination
in financing, the Rodriguez decision seemed to dissipate any hopes that the
federal courts could be relied upon to remedy inequality in school spending.
Less than two weeks after that decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court struck
down the school finance formula325 of that state as a violation of the "thor-
ough and efficient" clause of its own constitution.326 Based on a historical
analysis of the reasons for the clause's adoption, the court determined in
Robinson v. Cahill: "[W]e do not doubt that an equal educational opportunity
for children was precisely in mind. "327 The case gave sustenance to a
generation of litigation that sought to remedy disparities in school spending on
the basis of state constitutional challenges.3 28 The effort has resulted in
limited success.
Since the Rodriguez decision, school-finance cases have been decided in
twenty-eight states.329 Half have resulted in decisions calling for greater
320. Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
• ..It is the very foundation of good citizenship. . . .In these days it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (emphasis added).
321. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
322. Id. at 24.
323. Id. at 25.
324. Id. at 44.
325. See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
326. The New Jersey Constitution requires a "thorough and efficient system of free public schools
for the instruction of all the children of the state." N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
327. 303 A.2d at 294.
328. See Jonathan Banks, Note, State Constitutional Analyses of Public School Finance Reform
Cases: Myth or Methodology?, 45 VAND. L. REv. 129 (1992); William E. Thro, Note, To Render Them
Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA.
L. REv. 1639 (1989).
329. See Douglas S. Reed, The People v. The Court: School Finance Reform and the New Jersey
Supreme Court, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 137, 138 (1994).
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equity.330 Even in those instances where the courts have been sympathetic to
challenges, it is problematic to effect the changes that would be required fbr
a fair distribution of resources.33' School finance fbrmulae generally reflect
the power structure of the jurisdictions that produce them. To redesign these
plans in favor of poor people without political influence is a political paradox
that would be especially difficult to overcome during times of severe fiscal
stress.
One should not assume that each of the twenty-eight formulae that have
been challenged is deserving of revision; or, as Rodriguez suggests, that any
sign of inequality in spending is inherently unfair. It is reasonable, however,
to assume that, at some level, the disparity of resources made available to rich
and poor populations violates the principle of equal opportunity. Empirical
evidence demonstrates that large disparities exist. 332 School finance reform
could be the window through which state judicial activists, cast in the Brennan
mold,333 might expand the legal definition of equal education." Thus far
the response of the state courts has been disappointing.
b. Achievement. There is no hard evidence of a direct empirical relationship
between education spending and student achievement. Coleman made this point
thirty years ago, 335 and more recent research continues to demonstrate that
resources must be utilized effectively both at the administrative and school
levels before increased dollars lead to improved performance. 336 It still seems
reasonable to presume, however, that it is better to have more money than less,
and that if resources are applied efficiently and effectively-that is, a larger
percentage of the budget flows to the classroom, staff is properly motivated,
330. See id. at 138-39.
331. See Michael Heise, State Constitutional Litigation, Educational Finance, and Legal Impact:
An EmpiricalAnalysis, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1735 (1995); G. Alan Hickrod, The Effect of Constitutional
Litigation on Educational Finance: A Preliminary Analysis, 18 J. EDUC. FIN. 180 (1992); Note,
Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1072 (1991).
332. See, e.g., MYRON SCHWARTZ & JAY MOSKOWITz, FISCAL EQUITY IN THE UNITED STATES
(1988); Linda Herbert et al., School Finance Inequities Among the States: The Problem from a National
Perspective, 19 J. EDUC. FIN. 231 (1988).
333. See The Bill of Rights and the States, supra note 183.
334. Scholars have identified three distinct waves of school finance litigation: the first, beginning
with Serrano, was based on the Equal Protection Clause in the Federal Constitution; the second followed
in the wake of San Antonio and was based upon state constitutional guarantees of equal protection. The
third stage, beginning in 1989, was based upon the education clauses in state constitutions; this stage
focuses on the adequacy or sufficiency of funds provided to students or school districts. See Michael
Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation and the "Third Wave ": From Equity to Adequacy,
68 TEMI. L. REv. 1151 (1995); William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana,
Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. &
EDUC. 219 (1990); Julie K. Underwood & William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: A New
Wave of Reform, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 517, 520-35 (1991).
335. See EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 312.
336. See ERIC HANUSHEK ET AL., MAKING SCHOOLS WORK: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE AND
CONTROLLING COSTS (1994); Odden, supra note 316.
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and instructional standards are high-an increase in resources will eventually
improve actual learning.
One cannot so easily honor the common-sense presumption that racial
integration improves performance. There is no compelling reason to believe
that merely mixing white and black children in a classroom, especially under
the duress of involuntary busing, helps black students. Though studies of the
subject abound,"17 there is no conclusive evidence that racial mixing necessar-
ily contributes to academic perfbrmance. Rather, powerful empirical evidence
shows continuing significant disparities in the academic achievement levels of
minority and white children across the country. Reviewing data produced for
the U.S. Department of Education's National Assessment of Educational
Progress between 1973 and 1992, Diane Ravitch fbund that while the achieve-
ment gap between minority and white students has narrowed somewhat,
significant differences in academic performance still remain.33
So from a racial-and implicitly a socioeconomic-perspective, the
condition of education in America can be described in two words: separate and
unequal.339 However one defines educational equality, whether in terms of
racial integration or resource allocations, one cannot disregard the proficiency
with which schools accommodate the learning needs of children. If American
education has any hope of living up to the promise of Brown, if it wishes to
achieve some semblance of equal opportunity, then it must resolve the gap in
learning between minority and white children.
0
337. See, e.g., ARMOR, supra note 286, at 91-98; THOMAS COOK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND BLACK ACHIEVEMENT (1984); NANCY ST. JOHN, SCHOOL DESEGREGA-
TION (1975); Robert L. Crain & Rita E. Mahard, Desegregaton and Black Achievement: A Review of
the Research, 42 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17 (1978).
338. See DIANE RAVITCH, NATIONAL STANDARDS IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 72 (1995). Ravitch
explains that NAEP scores are a more reliable barometer than SAT scores because, while SAT scores
measure performance of a select college-bound population of students, NAEP data is based on
scientifically selected national samples that remain comparable over time. See id. at 71. For an overview
of the national performance data, see id. at 59-97.
When the test scores of 17-year-olds were compared on a 500 point scale in 1992, the gap between
black and white students was 26 points in mathematics and 37 points in reading; similarly, the gap in
reading between whites and Hispanics was 26 points. See id. at 72. Moreover, at each proficiency level
in mathematics, the scores for black and Hispanic 12th graders were similar to those of white 8th
graders. See id.
Similar disparities are evident for the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores among college-bound
seniors in 1996. On the verbal test where the overall average score was 505, the average score for
whites was 526, while for blacks it was 434, and for Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans and other
Hispanics it averaged 455, 452, and 465 respectively. COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS, 1995 PROFILE OF SAT
PROGRAM TEST TAKERS, COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION BOARD AND EDUCATIONAL TESTING
SERVICE (1996). In mathematics, where the overall average was 508, whites averaged 523, blacks
averaged 422, and Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and other Hispanics averaged 459,445, and 466,
respectively. See id.
339. For a dramatic journalistic treatment of the subject, see JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE
INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1991).
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B. The Salience of Choice
1. Contemporary Approaches
The idea of choice in education is not novel. It has had a manifold history,
according to the circumstances under which it was instituted and the ends it
sought to accomplish. Opponents recall the establishment of all-white southern
academies under the banner of choice when, in the wake of Brown, it became
unlawful to perpetuate segregated public schools.3'4 The practice was voided
by the Court in 1964. 41' Choice has also been used as a vehicle for school
integration-a relatively effective one-based on volunteerism and the creation
of high-quality magnet schools. 42 This Article will consider three contempo-
rary manifestations of the idea: the public school model, the market model, and
what we will call the "equal opportunity model."
a. The Public School Model. Beyond their objective of racial integration,
public school choice programs have functioned effectively as mechanisms to
extend educational options available to parents and children. Typically, they
allow students to select schools geographically farther than those schools
ordinarily available to them. Cambridge, Massachusetts instituted the first city-
wide controlled choice plan in 1981." District Four in New York's East
Harlem has implemented one of the most celebrated public choice programs in
an inner-city community,' and in 1985, Minnesota adopted the first
statewide inter-district choice program.4 5 By 1991, ten states had enacted
choice legislation, 34 and today, twenty states have some kind of public
school choice program."'
340. See JEFFREY R. HENIG, RETHINKING SCHOOL CHOICE: LIMITS OF THE MARKET METAPHOR
104-06 (1994).
341. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (declaring freedom of choice plan where
obstacles to choice were placed in path of black parents and children unconstitutional).
342. See ARMOR, supra note 286, at 13-16, 180-94, 211-34; LAURI STEEL ET AL., AMERICAN
INSTS. FOR RESEARCH, MAGNET SCHOOLS AND DESEGREGATION, QUALITY, AND CHOICE (1993);
ROSSELL, THE CARROT OR STICK, supra note 293; Christine H. Rossell, Controlled Choice
Desegregation Plans: Not Enough Choice, Too Much Control, 31 URB. AFF. REV. 43 (1995).
343. See Robert S. Peterkin & Dorothy S. Jones, Schools of Choice in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
in PUBLIC SCHOOLS BY CHOICE (Joe Nathan ed., 1989) (describing Cambridge controlled choice plan,
which allows students to select schools on first come, first-served basis so long as space exists and
assignment has positive effect on racial balance in that school grade).
344. See SEYMOUR FLIEGEL, MIRACLE IN EAST HARLEM: THE FIGHT FOR CHOICE IN EAST
HARLEM 97-114 (1993).
345. See Tim L. Mazzoni, Analyzing State School Policy-Making: An Arena Model, 13 EDuc.
EvAL. & POL'Y. ANAL. 115 (1991).
346. See PETER W. COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICAN
EDUCATION 39 (1994). See generally id. at 38-50, 139-52.
347. See ALLYSON M. TUCKER & WILLIAM F. LAUBER, HERITAGE FOUND., SCHOOL CHOICE
PROGRAMS: WHAT'S HAPPENING IN THE STATES 5-6 (1995).
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The basic shortcoming of such choice programs is that school districts
serving disadvantaged populations with the greatest need for expanded
opportunities often provide students with the least desirable options from which
to choose. In Massachusetts, for example, where voluntary inter-district choice
has existed since 1991, only twenty-five percent of the districts participate and
those participating include none of the twenty-nine districts on the suburban
rim of Boston. 8 Technically, New York City has had a city-wide school
choice plan since 1991.11 In reality choice exists in only six of thirty-two
districts and, even in those districts where it has been adopted, space in
desirable schools is extremely limited.350
Further evidence indicates that under certain conditions, public school
choice can exacerbate existing inequalities. When limited options exist, the
most articulate and aggressive parents are often the most effective school
shoppers. The result is that middle-class students with high achievement levels
exit failing schools and leave behind the poorer performers.351 Other
research, however, indicates that the outcome of choice programs and the
determination of their beneficiaries depends on the objectives and design of the
program.352 Thus, gross generalizations about who benefits from school
choice programs can be misleading.
b. The Market Model. One of the earliest appeals for choice in education
emerged from the field of economics, when Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman
proposed a publicly supported voucher system for American schools.353
Friedman envisioned a free-market model of schooling with a limited
governmental role, concerned primarily with maintaining minimum standards
for teaching and learning. Under this plan primary and secondary education
would be provided mainly by private institutions. Parents could select any
school-private or parochial-that met minimum standards. Friedman thus
hoped to weaken the government monopoly over publicly supported education,
replacing it with a more competitive system that would force failing institutions
to close and provide incentives for high performance in the others."
348. See ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, SCHOOL CHOICE IN MASSACHUSETTS 67 (1991).
349. See Josh Barnabel, Board of Education Votes a School Choice Program, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 1993, at B3.
350. Interview with Raymond Damonico, Executive Director of the Public Education Association,
New York City (June 12, 1996).
351. See Robert G. Croninger & Julia B. Smith, Equity and Choice in Detroit, in WHO CHOOSES?
WHO LOSES? CULTURE, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE UNEQUAL EFFECTS OF SCHOOL CHOICE 73-74
(Richard Elmore & Bruce Fuller, eds., 1996).
352. Valerie J. Martinez et al., The Consequences of School Choice: Who Leaves and Who Stays
in the Inner City, 76 Soc. SCi. Q. 485, 495-500 (1995).
353. See Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 123, 127-33 (R.A. Solo ed., 1955).
354. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE
FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT (1980).
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The market model again moved to center stage in the choice debate when
John Chubb and Terry Moe published their landmark study on schooling in
America.35 Chubb and Moe analyzed extensive data sets on student achieve-
ment and examined the organizational variables that contribute to high
performance, documenting the superiority of private and parochial institutions
over their public school counterparts.356 Political scientists by training,
Chubb and Moe offered a scathing indictment of the bureaucratic and political
systems that undermine sound education.357 They took particular aim at
organized interests like teachers' unions who stood as a major obstacle to
reform in public education. Their critique of American democracy, and their
endorsement of the market model, has provoked a strong reaction among other
social scientists.35 Antagonists fear that even if a voucher system based on
the market model could succeed on an experimental basis, on a larger scale,
it would skim the best students from government-run institutions and eventually
lead to the demise of public education.359
2. The Equal Opportunity Model
The "equal opportunity model" is a variation of the market approach. It is
similar in that it includes a private school option and has the potential to create
more competition among educational institutions. Unlike a pure market model,
however, it does not seek to eliminate public schooling, and its target
population is limited to only a small segment of the school community-the
poor. In the latter sense, this approach also minimizes the possibility of elitism
or the phenomenon of skimming.
The idea was originally formalized by two legal scholars, John Coons and
Stephen Sugarman.3" It is particularly germane to the subject of inquiry in
this article for two reasons: first, it supports the philosophical premises
underlying most contemporary legislative proposals either under serious
consideration or already enacted; second, it represents a public policy that can
help resolve the learning gap between minority and white students.3 61 The
355. JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990).
356. See id.
357. See id. at 26-68, 142-229.
358. See HENIG, supra note 340; KEVIN B. SMITH & KENNETH J. MEIER, THE CASE AGAINST
SCHOOL CHOICE (1995).
359. See Mary Jane Guy, The American Common Schools: A Nation at Risk, 21 J. L. & EDuC. 569
(1992). For a more general overview, see COOKSON, supra note 346; AMY STUART WELLS, TIME TO
CHOOSE: AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS OF SCHOOL CHOICE POLICY (1993).
360. See JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR
FAMILY CONTROL (1978); John E. Coons & Stephen D. Sugarman, Family Choice in Education: A
Model State System for Vouchers, 59 CAL. L. REV. 321 (1971).
361. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Part of the Solution Rather Than Part of the Problem: A Role for
American Private Elementary and Secondary Schools in the 1990s, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 681
(1990); Stephen D. Sugarman, Using Private Schools to Promote Public Values, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171
(1991).
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equal opportunity model of school choice is a manifestation of the child benefit
theory applied with a social conscience.362
a. Theory into Practice. We no longer need to discuss private school choice
in the abstract. It exists in laws emerging from state legislatures and in
proposals under serious consideration at the state and national levels. Most of
these programs or live proposals are specifically designed to benefit poor
communities and to provide them with the economic means to attend private
institutions." Most also include a public school option, giving public schools
a chance to compete for students, and eliminating any risk of favored treatment
for private institutions.3"
At present scholarship programs have been enacted in two states-
Wisconsin and Ohio-as well as the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. In both
Wisconsin" and Ohio, 3" the enabling legislation was passed at the urging
of minority parents who had become frustrated with the poor quality of public
schools available to their children and who wanted to improve their educational
opportunities by gaining access to private schools. In Wisconsin, eligibility is
restricted to children in Milwaukee whose family incomes do not exceed 175%
of the federal poverty level. 3" In Ohio, participation is limited to students in
Cleveland, and applications from low-income students are given priority.3 6
As mentioned above, the choice plan enacted in Puerto Rico was targeted at
families with an annual income not exceeding $18,000."6
362. One of the most compelling essays on the subject is Diane Ravitch, Somebody's Children:
Expanding Educational Opportunities For All Children, 12 BROOKINGS REv. 4 (1995).
363. See Joseph P. Viteritti, Stacking the Deck for the Poor: The New Politics of School Choice,
14 BROOKINGS REV. 10 (1996) (describing recent forms of choice programs in policy arena).
364. As we have seen from our review of the case law, favoring private or parochial schools with
resources that are not made available to public institutions could run afoul of the Constitution. See
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). For an illustration of
a law conceived in the spirit of the equal opportunity model to promote educational equity and pass
constitutional review, see John E. Coons & Stephen D. Sugarman, The Scholarship Initiative: A Model
State Law for Elementary and Secondary School Choice, 21 J. L. & EDUC. 529 (1992).
365. See Peter Applebome, Milwaukee Faces Debate on Vouchers, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 1, 1995, at
A12; Richard A. Melcher & Michele Galen, Milwaukee's Lesson Plan, Bus. WK., Apr. 17, 1995, at
70.
366. Carol Innerst, Cleveland Experiments With School Vouchers, WASH. TIMEs, July 4, 1995, at
A4 (noting that support of Fannie Lewis, black Cleveland legislator, was important in securing passage
of school choice legislation).
367. Applebome, supra note 365. A recent report by the former superintendent of schools in
Milwaukee indicates that a majority of the eligible students come from neighborhoods with the highest
concentrations of poverty, 40% are from families headed by a single family, 75-80% are minorities, and
they have below average achievement scores when compared to other Milwaukee public school students.
HOWARD L. FULLER & SAMMIs B. WHITE, WIS. POL. RES. INST., EXPANDED SCHOOL CHOICE IN
MILWAUKEE: A PROFILE OF ELIGIBLE STUDENTS AND SCHOOLS (1995).
368. The constitutionality of the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring program was upheld by a state
trial court on July 31, 1996, and is currently under appeal. Mary B.W. Taylor, Ohio Upholds Public
Funding of Private and Religious Schools, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1996, at A19.
369. See AHEAD OF THE LEARNING CURVE, supra note 264.
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School choice has also garnered serious support from the governors of
Connecticut,"37 Pennsylvania,37 ' Texas372  Massachusetts, 373  Minneso-
ta, 374 and California. 75 All favor the appropriation of resources to parents
on the basis of economic need in order to allow disadvantaged children to
attend the private or parochial schools of their choice. A pilot program
proposed for New Jersey would have made vouchers available to all students
in Jersey City, a predominantly poor minority district where the public school
system has recently been put under state receivership.376 Legislation has been
introduced in Congress that would give tuition scholarships to students in the
District of Columbia with a family income that does not exceed 185% of the
federal poverty level. 3 77 Income-based choice proposals have also been
introduced in the state legislatures of Arizona, Illinois, Maryland, and New
Mexico.78
In programmatic form, school choice has come a long way from the market
model originally espoused by Milton Friedman in 1955. Rather than a scheme
to eradicate public schools, choice in its contemporary format might more aptly
be described as an initiative designed to reshape the landscape of American
education so that it is more responsive to the needs of the poor. Or, one might
say that choice in its present incarnation has been crafted to provide minorities
370. The plan proposed by Governor John Rowland would provide scholarship money to families
who are economically eligible for federal school lunch programs. See Jonathan Rabinovitz, Governor
Renews Call on Vouchers for Schools, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 7, 1995, at B6.
371. Governor Tom Ridge's plan would offer equal opportunity grants available on the basis of
family income with a gradually accelerated maximum: $15,000 during the first year of operation,
$20,000 in the second, and $25,000 in the third, increasing up to $70,000 by the year 2000. See Laura
Miller, Pa. Governor Unveils Details of Statewide Voucher Plan, EDuc. WK., May 17, 1995.
372. A bill was passed in the Texas Senate in 1995 that would have provided scholarships for
350,000 low-income families, but it failed in the House of Representatives. See BLUM CENTER,
MARQUETTE UNIV., EDUCATIONAL FREEDOM REPORT 4 (1995) [hereinafter BLUM CENTER REPORT].
373. In November, 1995, Governor Weld proposed an educational voucher plan for low-income
families and an amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution that would allow parochial school students
to participate. See id. at 3.
374. In November, 1995, Governor Arne Carlson announced his intention to propose a pilot
voucher program for Minneapolis and St. Paul. The awards would be granted on a sliding scale
according to income, with an eventual earnings cap of $41,600 for a family of four. See Dane Smith,
Carlson Proposes School Vouchers, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, St. Paul), Nov. 16, 1995, at 1A.
375. In his annual State of the State message in January, 1996, Governor Pete Wilson proposed
opportunity scholarships for students who attend schools that score in the bottom five percent statewide
on standardized tests. California Chief Proposes School Choice Plan, N.Y. TiMvES, Jan. 10, 1996, at
Al.
376. See Kimberly J. McLarin, Jersey Ci'y Weighs Effect of Vouchers for Schools, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 1994, at B6.
377. See Robert C. Johnston, D.C. Budget Bill Includes School Voucher Plan, EDUC. WK., Nov.
8, 1995, at 19. The proposed 1995 "Low Income School Choice Demonstration Act" would allow any
child eligible to participate in the national school lunch program to receive a voucher to attend a public
or private school of choice. The same act would authorize grants to from to twenty low-income school
districts to establish voucher-based school-choice programs. See BLUM CENTER REPORT, supra note 372,
at 4.
378. See BLUM CENTER REPORT, supra note 372, at 1-3.
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and the poor with alternatives to a system of public education that for them has
proven to be both separate and unequal.
b. Parochial Schools. There are a number of reasons why parochial
schools, especially Catholic institutions, are pertinent to the equal opportunity
model of school choice. First there is the constitutional issue regarding the
First Amendment, which this Article addressed earlier, and which will be
further discussed in the next section. Next there is the issue of sheer
volume.379 Approximately forty-six percent of all private elementary school
students and fifty-one percent of private high school students in the United
States attend Catholic institutions.3" The ratio in large cities with concentra-
tions of black and Hispanic students is higher.38' If private schools are
factored into the national commitment to close the learning gap suffered by
racial minorities, then Catholic institutions will figure prominently in
determining the outcome.
I do not mean to suggest here that choice should be valued as a way of
channeling public funds into Catholic schools. I focus on Catholic schools
because they provide the most compelling evidence available on how choice
can improve the educational opportunities of disadvantaged children. As will
be explained below, choice can serve as a vehicle for the creation and growth
of a variety of new institutions-private, parochial, and even public. Choice
can help foster the growth of existing institutions in the minority community,
such as those which have recently begun to appear under the sponsorship of
black Protestant churches. For now, however, the strongest evidence in support
of the choice alternative is found in Catholic schools.
The evidence on Catholic schools is both voluminous and impressive. James
Coleman and his colleagues produced the first comprehensive study in 1982,
finding that Catholic schools were less racially segregated and were associated
with higher cognitive achievement than public schools.382 The study became
highly controversial. Reputable social scientists re-analyzing the data claimed
that much of the achievement associated with Catholic schools is the result of
a self-selection process that brought the best students to their doors.383
. 379. As of 1990-91, 2,555,932 students attended Catholic schools. DON MCLAUGHtUN ET AL.,
U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1990-91,
(NCES 95-330 1995).
380. National Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics (1994).
381. Catholic schools are predominantly urban, with 61% located in cities of more than 100,000
inhabitants; 22% are found in areas where the population is more than 25% black; 15% are found in
areas where the population is more than 25 % Hispanic. ANTHONY S. BRYK ET AL., CATHOUC SCHOOLS
AND THE COMMON GOOD 73 (1993).
382. See JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: PUBLIC, CATHOLIC, AND
PRIVATE SCHOOLS COMPARED (1982).
383. See Arthur S. Goldberger & Glen G. Cain, The Causal Analysis of Cognitive Outcomes in the
Coleman, Hoffer, Kilgore Report, 55 Soc. EDUC. 103 (1982); Jay Noell, Public and Catholic Schools:
A Reanalysis of the 'Public and Private Schools,' 55 Soc. EDuc. 123 (1982).
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During the same year as the Coleman study, Andrew Greeley completed a
report demonstrating that Catholic schools were particularly successful in
raising the achievement scores of the most disadvantaged minority youth.3"
Subsequent research by Coleman, Greeley, and their associates confirmed their
earlier findings.3"
The most comprehensive analysis of Catholic education to date was
published by Bryk, Lee, and Holland in 1993 .386 It supported the previous
research indicating that Catholic schools surpass public schools in academic
achievement and that they are particularly outstanding in accommodating the
educational needs of the urban poor.3' Not only had these institutions
demonstrated a capacity to close the learning gap between black and white, rich
and poor, they did so in less segregated settings than in public education.388
The greatest contribution of Bryk and his colleagues was their explanation
of how Catholic schools manage to excel. Striking down the myth that Catholic
schools are selective or exclusive, they attributed student performance to the
very characteristics of the schools themselves, which read like a classic
analogue from the effective schools literature. 389 But the real story of
Catholic education has to do with its structure of values: the sense of
community, the ethos of caring, and the fundamental belief that all children are
educable at the highest level."
Catholic education advances the egalitarianism envisioned by the Court in
Brown. Borrowing from a term first used by Coleman, Bryk and his associates
concur that "Catholic schools better approximated the common school
ideal," 39' assimilating the poor, the alienated, and the culturally distinct into
the mainstream of American life. They convey values that are the foundation
of a democratic society: compassion, tolerance, and commitment to justice."
384. See ANDREW M. GREELEY, CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOLS AND MINORITY STUDENTS (1982); see
also JAMES G. CIBULKA ET AL., INNER-CITY PRIVATE ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS: A STUDY (1982)
(analyzing data of effectiveness of inner-city private elementary schools.)
385. See JAMES S. COLEMAN & THOMAS HOFFER, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HIGH SCHOOLS: THE
IMPACT OF COMMUNITIES (1987); Thomas Hoffer et al., Achievement Growth in Public and Private
Schools, 58 Soc. EDuc. 74 (1985).
386. See BRYK ET AL., supra note 381.
387. See id. at 247, 272-94.
388. See id. at 73, 289.
389. These include such factors as high standards, a core academic curriculum, decentralized
governance, strong leadership, parental involvement, an orderly environment, and dedicated teachers.
See id. at 81-168, 245-328; see also Ronald Edmonds, Effective Schools for the Urban Poor, 37 EDUC.
LEADERSHIP 15 (1979) (describing characteristics of effective school).
390. See BRYK ET AL., supra note 381, at 126-48, 272-96; see also PAUL T. HILL ET AL., RAND
CoRp., HIGH SCHOOLS WITH CHARACTER (comparing values of Catholic schools with comprehensive
high schools and magnet schools).
391. BRYK ET AL., supra note 381, at 57.
392. See id. at 134-35.
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Although many children who attend them are not Catholic, Catholic schools
are religious institutions. 3" Their value premises spring from the Bible and
its interpretation through an ecclesiastical hierarchy of dogma.3" One might
reasonably argue that their record provides us with an illustrative case study
of the compatibility of theologically based education and the republican ideals
of civic virtue. Nevertheless, as sectarian institutions, their governmental
funding is contestable under the federal and state constitutions.
C. Values in Education
It is the very character of these sectarian schools that raises constitutional
questions. The value premises underlying their curriculum are based on an
understanding of a higher order of being, defined through theological teachings
about the relationship between that which is human and that which is
divine.3" Separationists have effectively argued that public support of such
institutions is a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
While the Court has accepted their arguments and proscribed direct support,
the Rehnquist Court also has been sympathetic to the idea of providing aid to
parents who would choose religious schools for their children.3" This
jurisprudence is indicative of a more pronounced inclination of the Court to
enforce aggressively the free exercise rights of individuals in interpreting the
First Amendment.
Some state courts have adopted stricter standards of separation in
interpreting their own constitutions, and occasionally even the U.S. Constitu-
tion, holding that public support of either a direct or indirect kind must be
limited to government run schools.3" The central question raised in this
Article is whether such strict separationist interpretations advanced by some of
the state courts violate the Court's standards of religious freedom. The answer
to this question requires an appreciation for the essential role that values play
in education: how they shape the overall character of both public and parochial
schools and how they may influence the decisions that parents make in
choosing schools for their children. Answering affirmatively, this Article will
argue that the strict separationist position is based on faulty assumptions about
the nature of public education and a fundamental misunderstanding of what it
means for a person to have religious convictions.
393. Approximately 13.2% of the students in Catholic schools are not Catholic. See Telephone
interview with Mary Jo Wilkins, National Catholic Education Association (1996).
394. See id.
395. For an exploration of the meaning of religious consciousness, see MIRCEA ELIADE, THE
SACRED AND THE PROFANE (1950).
396. See supra Subsection I.B.3.
397. See supra Section H.B.
Vol. 15:113, 1996
Religious Freedom and Educational Opportunity
1. The Myth of the Common Schoor 98
Public schooling in the United States grows out of a liberal tradition,
betraying both a tolerance for and a suspicion of religious belief. Describing
its basic tenets in a Jeffersonian context, we have already noted that behind the
high wall of separation was a predisposition towards government authority over
religiously motivated conduct.3 This inclination was a result of a rationalism
that emerged from the European Enlightenment' and a genuine desire to
preserve the public order. Religious thought was not given an elevated position
in the intellectual scheme of liberalism because, unlike the scientific discoveries
of the era from which it sprung, it was a matter of faith, and could not be
verified by empirical evidence."' And since religious freedom could lead to
dissension among the populace, the influence of religious thought had to be
kept in check to protect against a complete breakdown of civil society. Of
course, liberalism was an act of faith in itself, founded on an exaggerated
confidence in the power of human inquiry, the potential of science, the
pretence of objectivity, and, in our own generation, the sacred position of the
common school.
a. Mann's Protestantism. Until the mid-nineteenth century, it was not
unusual for the government to support church-run schools in New York, New
Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. 2 The common school
was to correct that, in the name of the republic. Open to all, public education
was to take the unwashed masses who immigrated from Europe and instruct
them at public expense in literacy, morality, and civic virtue. 40 As Horace
Mann expounded in the Twelfth Annual Report to the Boston School Committee:
"It may be easy to make a Republic, but it is very laborious to make Republi-
cans. "4 Mann and other common school advocates swore allegiance to
religious neutrality, calling for "the entire exclusion of religious teaching" 5
398. This heading is taken from the title of a book on the history of public education in
Massachusetts, CHARLES L. GLENN, THE MYTH OF THE COMMON SCHOOL (1988).
399. See supra Subsection I.A.2.a.
400. See JOHN GRAY, LIBERALISM 9-25 (2d ed. 1995). For a history of the period and an analysis
of its influence on Western thinking, see PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION
(1977).
401. See AMY GUTMAN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987); Susanna Sherry, Responsible
Republicanism: Educatingfor Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 131 (1995).
402. See CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY, 1780-1860, at 166-67 (1983).
403. See LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOL: AN HISTORIC CONCEPTION
29-47 (1951). See generally THE REPUBLIC AND THE SCHOOL: HORACE MANN ON THE EDUCATION OF
FREE MAN 59-112 (Lawrence A. Cremin ed., 1957) (excerpting 12 annual reports prepared by Mann
for Boston School Committee).
404. See CREMIN, supra note 403, at 70-71.
405. Horace Mann, First Annual Report to the Board of Education (1837), cited in GLENN, supra
note 398, at 163.
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from within its walls. But, in fact, Mann and his collaborators were committed
to incorporating religion into the curriculum. 0 6 By 1840 he would publicly
explain to a group of his teachers how best to instruct the children within their
charge, urging that they "train them up to the love of God and the love of
man: to make the perfect example of Jesus Christ lovely in their eyes; and to
give to all so much of the religious instruction as is compatible with the rights
of others and with the genius of our government."4 7
Mann's "religious neutrality" involved a daily reading of the King James
Bible in the classrooms of the common school, a practice that was potentially
offensive to Catholics, Jews, and even certain Protestant sects. Mann truly
believed that if teachers and students read the Bible, his Bible, without
comment, it was a neutral act that would permit them to discover its truths on
their own."8 In reality the common school was an instrument for the
propagation of a mainstream Protestant morality,4"9 drenched in a nativist
philosophy that prepared the nation for the Blaine Amendment and the
mentality it fostered throughout the states.41 This chauvinism motivated
Catholic leaders to seek public support for the establishment of their own
school system.41'
b. Dewey's Secularism. One of the most influential thinkers on American
education in the twentieth century, John Dewey was resolute in his determina-
tion to rid public schools of any religious influence. A devout secularist steeped
in the liberal tradition,412 Dewey had a celebrated contempt for organized
religion, its otherworldliness, and its "servile acceptance of imposed
dogma."413 He was thoroughly persuaded of the power of scientific inquiry
to derive the moral and pedagogical truths that belonged in the schools, and he
dismissed religious teaching as a worthless and counterproductive endeav-
or.
414
406. Thus, his First Report continues, "Entirely to discard the inculcation of the great doctrines of
morality and of natural theology has a vehement tendency to drive mankind into opposite extremes."
GLENN, supra note 398, at 163.
407. HORACE MANN, WHAT GOD DOES AND WHAT HE LEAVES FOR MAN TO Do IN THE WORK
OF EDUCATION (1840), cited in GLENN, supra note 398, at 163.
408. For a general history of the common school phenomenon, see FREDERICK M. BINDER, THE
AGE OF THE COMMON SCHOOL, 1830-1865 (1974).
409. See generally GLENN, supra note 398, at 146-206; STANLEY K. SCHULTZ, THE CULTURE
FACTORY: BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1789-1860, at 103-56 (1973).
410. See supra Subsection ll.A.2.
411. See THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS, supra note 170, at 3-78.
412. For a sympathetic intellectual biography of Dewey, see ALAN RYAN, JOHN DEWEY AND THE
HIGH TIDE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM (1995).
413. JOHN DEWEY, A COMMON FAITH 7 (1934), cited in McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra
note 5, at 123 [hereinafter A COMMON FAITH]; see also JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION
219-30, 326 (1916).
414. Writing on religion, Dewey claimed there is "nothing left worth preserving in the notions of
unseen powers, controlling human destiny to which obedience, reverence and worship are due." A
COMMON FAITH, supra note 413, at 7.
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Dewey's "pragmatism" enlisted the educational process as a force for social
change; but his work would be distorted by latter-day progressives who used
the pretence of scientific objectivity and authority to impose their own
orthodoxy within the profession, eventually provoking criticism from Dewey
himself.4I5 Through the century the educational system retained a steadfast
secularism that was a hallmark of Dewey's liberalism. 416 Nor would profes-
sionals forsake the cultural mission embraced by both Mann and Dewey: the
inculcation of societal values for the sake of civic harmony. In the grip of a
rigid bureaucratic system developed by turn of the century reformers,417
secular humanism became an oppressive force for those minorities who were
not like-minded. Worst yet, given the political nature of public schooling in
America, those interests powerful enough to wrest control of the bureaucracy
enjoyed inordinate influence over decisionmaking.1 s Stephen Arons, one of
the first legal scholars to address the problem of the public school culture,
warned:
The history of conflict over school orthodoxy changed profoundly with the advent
of compulsory attendance laws. Once the audience became virtually captive and the
control became majoritarian, it was necessary for a variety of social groups to
contest with each other over whose values and world view would be adopted by the
local public school. Parents began to be viewed by educators as presumptively
incompetent; and schooling became less an issue of individual development and
family aspiration and more an issue of social needs and group values.
419
To support his observation, Arons relates three case studies touching on
disputes ranging from curriculum control, to home education, to government
control over private schools.420 But the examples are legion. Stephen Bates
tells the story of a group of fundamentalist parents in Tennessee who did not
want their children exposed to certain literature adopted by the local school
415. See JOHN DEwEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION (1938). On the history of the Progressive
Movement in education, see LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL:
PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1876-1957 (1961).
416. See STEVEN C. ROCKEFELLER, JOHN DEWEY: RELIGIOUS FAITH AND DEMOCRATIC
HUMANISM (1991).
417. On the history of the reform movement, see RAYMOND E. CALLAHAN, EDUCATION AND THE
CULT OF EFFICIENCY (1962); PAUL E. PETERSON, THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL REFORM, 1870-1940
(1985); DAVID B. TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN URBAN EDUCATION
(1974).
418. For an analysis of school politics at the local level and its negative impact on the poor, see
JOSEPH P. VITERTm, ACROSS THE RIVER: POLITICS AND EDUCATION IN THE CITY (1983). For a more
general treatment of the political environment surrounding policy making at the local, state and federal
levels, see FREDERICK WIRT & MICHAEL KIRST, SCHOOLS IN CONFLICT (3d ed., 1992); see also,
CHUBB & MOE, supra note 355, at 26-68, 142-229 (discussing institutional perspective, context, and
school organization).
419. STEPHEN ARONS, COMPELLING BELIEF: THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN SCHOOLING xi (1983).
420. See id.
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board.42 Stephen Carter has given an account of how the Board of Education
in New York City distributed condoms to students against the will of their
parents and in violation of their religious beliefs.422 In the New York case,
parents were not even initially granted the opportunity to opt out of the
program if it offended their faith; the Board of Education-or four of its seven
members-had decided that it knew what was in the best interest of these
students. The problem of clashing values within public education became more
obvious as the public school population grew more diverse.423 Beyond the
issue of an underlying systemic philosophy lies the extraordinary power of
individual educators to mold the young impressionable minds of students who
sit before them as a captive audience.4" Public education is value laden, and
the values that it attempts to instill under the guise of a public philosophy are
not always supported by the entire community it presumes to serve.
Reasonable people could disagree as to whether Dewey's secularism was
more threatening to the spirit of democracy than was Mann's Protestantism, or
the ever-present possibility of an insensitive or opinionated school board. But
to focus on such a futile debate would distract us from the important lesson to
be learned. The point here is more profound. When individuals have the power
to determine the values that should be taught to other people's children, it is
a potentially threatening condition in a free society. Whether the orientation of
the school master is driven by faith, science, philosophy, ideology, ignorance,
arrogance, or raw prejudice, it has the same consequence for the parent whose
principles are being undermined by public authority.
2. Misconstruing Religion
Let us consider further the predicament of a religious minority whose child
attends public school. Take, for instance, the Orthodox Jewish parents in New
York City whose daughter or son is required to attend a sex-education class
that condones behavior the family believes to be immoral.425 What alternative
do the parents have but to subject their children to teachings that contradict
their religious convictions? According to Pierce,42 although compulsory
421. See STEPHEN BATES, BATTLEGROUND: ONE MOTHER'S CRUSADE, THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT,
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF OUR CL.ASSROOMS (1993).
422. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TmVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 171 (1993).
423. See, e.g., Rosemary C. Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the
Voices of Dissent, YALE L. & POL'Y. REv. (1996) (arguing that 'common school' is incapable of
accommodating diverse religious and philosophical orientations that emerge in pluralist society).
424. See MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW AND GOVERNMENT
ExPRESSION IN AMERICA 52-55 (1983); Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of
Religious Orthodoxy": Value Training in the Public Schools, U. ILL. L. REV. 15 (1987).
425. See George Dent, Religious C7zildren, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 863 (1988)
(analyzing tensions between religious freedom and public education).
426. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518-19 (1925).
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education laws are permissible under the Constitution, parents may not be
required to educate their children in a public school. Therefore, if the parents
are offended by the values conveyed by a school, they can leave. If they do not
have access to a public school to their liking-one that does not undermine the
religious principles they want instilled in their children-they may choose a
private institution.
Of course, for those parents who make a decision to leave the public
school, the choice usually comes at a cost: They will have to take financial
responsibility for the private or parochial school tuition expense. In other
words, to avoid subjecting their children to lessons in a government-run
institution that undermine their religious principles, the parents must assume
a burden that is not imposed on the majority. One might say that this
minority's religious freedom is circumscribed the moment it chooses to act
according to its conscience. How can we in a society that claims to protect
religious freedom explain or justify the limit imposed on the religious liberty
of these individuals? What state interest has been protected or advanced by the
presumptuous school board?
As noted above, the liberal approach to religious freedom entertains a
serious distinction between the rights of conscience and religiously motivated
activity.427 Religion is to be tolerated, but not supported. When taken to
excess-and who knows when that occurs-religious devotion can create dual
loyalties among the populace and compromise the well-being of the state.
Liberalism assumes a basic tension between the City of God and the City of
Man, and when the state serves as arbiter between the two, it is expected to
favor the latter. Neither this assumption nor this predisposition have merit.
a. ivic Virtue. Opponents of school choice often argue their case from the
liberal position. They claim that government support to parents who opt out of
public schools jeopardizes not only public education, but the commonwealth
itself, since the state relies on public schools to inculcate a public philoso-
phy.428 Their assessment of the role of public education is a fair one, but
their memories have failed them. They do not seem to recall that public
education in America has betrayed a historic bias, at one time mainstream
Protestant and nativist, at another secular and anti-religious, and at others
beholden to those who act on their own behalf but articulate their political
agenda in terms of the public interest.429 Moreover, public education has
largely failed the poor, investing them with a system of schooling that is
separate, unequal and ineffective.43°
427. See supra Subsection I.A.2a.
428. See Guy, supra note 359.
429. See supra Subsection nl.C.l.
430. Id.
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The suggestion here from choice critics is that educating children in private
institutions does not contribute to public-spiritedness, or what republicans call
civic virtue.43' The research on Catholic schools does not support that
assertion; to the contrary it shows that these schools impart values that are
supportive of the democratic ideal.4 32 There is nothing inherently antagonistic
between religion and civic virtue. 33 American democracy was developed by
and among a people who were deeply religious.434
Tocqueville, perhaps the most insightful student of American culture, and
an admirer of the constitutional separation of church and state, observed more
than 150 years ago that religion, by helping to overcome the excessive
individualism toward which free societies are prone, cultivates a sense of
caring for one's fellows that promotes the republican spirit.4 35 Empirical
studies conducted by contemporary scholars indicates a strong association
between church membership and civic virtue. Just a decade ago, Robert Bellah
and his associates, completing a massive five-year investigation of American
values found, "Religion is one of the most important of the many ways in
which Americans 'get involved' in the life of their community and soci-
ety."4 36 The empirical literature from political science is replete with
evidence of how various intermediary social institutions, including ecclesiastic
ones, prepare individuals with the skills for meaningful participation in political
life. 37 Of particular note is a landmark study on civic volunteerism led by
Sidney Verba.435 Verba's team identified a strong connection between
religious involvement and civic involvement.4 39 Describing church organiza-
tions as the least stratified, most democratic of our social units,' they found
that religious institutions play an especially crucial role in "enriching the
stockpile of participatory factors for those who are otherwise disadvan-
taged.""' In this sense, the church functions as a force for advancing
political and social equality.
431. See supra Subsection I.A.2b.
432. See BRYK ET AL., supra note 381, at 134-35; HILL ET AL., supra note 390.
433. See James S. Coleman, Changes in the Family and Implicatlions for the Common School, 1991
U. CHl. LEGAL F. 153, 159-60 (1991) (arguing that religious schools with strong values may fill
important void in society where family structure is so vulnerable).
434. See supra Subsection I.A.1 and accompanying notes.
435. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 408-14 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner
eds., George Lawrence trans., 1966).
436. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN
AMERICAN LIFE 219 (1996).
437. See SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL DEMOCRACY
AND SOCIAL EQUALITY (1972).
438. See SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN
POLITICS (1995).
439. See id. at 75-79.
440. See id. at 243-46, 317.
441. Id. at 519.
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Few need to be reminded of the important role that the church has
historically played in black society-not only as a refuge from the abuses of
slavery, but as an engine that propelled the civil rights movement. 442 Its
central place in the black community remains a fact of everyday life. As Eric
Lincoln and Lawrence Mamiya knowingly remark, "The Black Church has no
challenger as the cultural womb of the black community."" 3 It has given
birth to community-service centers, day-care centers, crisis-intervention
centers, soup kitchens, nursing homes, low-income housing, credit unions,
banks, insurance companies, and, perhaps most relevantly to the present
discussion, schools.
What a hopeful presence such schools must be, when perceived as an
alternative to failing public schools in the inner city. Lincoln and Mamiya
pointed to an elementary and junior high school run by the Concord Baptist
Church in Brooklyn and the elementary academy operated by the Bethel
A.M.E. Church in Baltimore as examples. 4' We might add to the list the
private schools founded by the Rev. Richard Tolliver in Chicago's Washington
Park neighborhood," 5  and by the Rev. Floyd Flake in St. Albans,
Queens. 4 6 Unfortunately the growth of such innovative ventures is stifled by
the strict separationist public policy implemented in most states that prohibits
aid to parents who would choose these schools for their children." 7
I do not mean to suggest here that the allocation of public funds for poor
children to attend schools of their choice is warranted purely on utilitarian
grounds. My objective here is to refute the utilitarian argument against choice,
which portrays it as a threat to the civic virtue that is supposed to be conveyed
through public schooling. In a broader sense, the point is to explain that choice
can serve to advance the egalitarian values cherished within our democratic
system. But in the final analysis, choice is an issue that pertains to a more
fundamental constitutional question.
b. Matters of Conscience. One might argue for school choice on the
grounds that it will improve the educational opportunities of the poor, or that
it may contribute to strengthening an institution that performs such a vital role
442. See JOHN H. FRANKIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS
(4th ed., 1988); ALDON'D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK
COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE (1984); HART M. NELSEN & ANN K. NELSEN, THE BLACK
CHURCH IN THE SIXTIES (1975).
443. C. ERIc LINCOLN & LAWRENCE. H. MAMIYA, THE BLACK CHURCH IN THE AFRICAN
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1990).
444. See id. at 190-91.
445. See Flynn McRoberts, Academy is Reborn By Faith, CHI. TRIB., May 7, 1995, §2, at 1.
446. See Somini Sengupta, Meshing the Sacred and the Secular, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1995, at
B1.
447. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Using Private Schools to Promote Public Values, U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 171, 189 (1991) (arguing that subsidized private choice can be effective tool for black
Protestant clergy who might be inclined to participate more directly in education of their congregations).
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in addressing our most persistent social dilemma." 8 In the end, however,
choice is very much an issue of religious freedom, one that we cannot
understand without appreciating the true meaning of religious life. Liberalism
forces us to treat religion as a private matter," 9 an unreasoned prejudice,4 50
a "hobby" as Stephen Carter has described it.45' The liberal approach
assumes that individuals can marginalize religious convictions from the general
course of life, keep conscience in its place, and live around it rather than
through it. It is no wonder that some commentators, observing public life in
America, have claimed that our politics is hostile to religion.452
The assertion of a divisible conscience makes no sense for the minority who
is serious about religion. For them, whether they be Christian Fundamentalists,
Mennonites, Moslems, Native Americans, or devout members of "mainstream"
Judeo-Christian congregations, religion is all-encompassing. It is a way of
life.4 3 We have already considered the unfbrtunate predicament of the
religious minority whose child attends public school, and the burden imposed
by the state through the power of the school board. For the deeply religious
family whose life is guided by doctrines of faith, the situation is even more
grave. For some of these families, it is not possible to separate religious
upbringing from education. Education is the route through which religious and
moral values are imparted to the child. Therefore, the selection of a sectarian
school is not merely a matter of preference, it is a matter of conscience. It is
a way of practicing one's faith.
While the interconnection between education and religion is sometimes
difficult to appreciate within a secular society, it was fully understood during
the founding era, when education was generally assumed to be the responsibili-
ty of the ecclesiastic congregation. 41 The Supreme Court, through its
interpretation of the Establishment Clause, has prohibited government support
for religious institutions. But when the state withholds public support from
individuals whose religious convictions require them to educate their children
according to their faith, it imposes severe burdens on their free exercise rights.
When the state denies such support to religious minorities who are poor, who
otherwise cannot afford to bear the cost of a secular education, it virtually
448. The term is borrowed from GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944).
449. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39
DEPAUL L. REv. 993 (1990).
450. See Stephen L. Carter, The Separation of Church and Self, 46 SMU L. REV. 585 (1992).
451. Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE
L.J. 977 (providing critical examination of liberal position).
452. See, for example, RicHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBUC SQUARE: REUGION AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78
VA. L. REv. 671 (1992).
453. See George W. Dent, Jr., Of God and Caesar: The Free Exercise Rights of Public School
Students, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 707 (1993).
454. See BAILYN, supra note 22.
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forecloses the opportunity fbr them to educate their children according to the
requirements of their conscience.
IV. CONCLUSION: INTEGRATING LIBERTY WITH EQUALITY
Beginning with Brown, the principle of equality, as applied through the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, has emerged as an
important instrument for weighing and advancing educational opportunity for
disadvantaged minorities in twentieth-century America. 55 This Article has
shown that school choice, as it is presently manifested in the policy realm, can
serve as an effective link between the unfulfilled aspirations of Brown and
educational practice at the school level.456 Providing poor children with the
economic means to attend private institutions expands the educational horizons
for a class of children whom public education has failed. It gives them access
to learning that was previously available only to those who could afford to pay
for it. It begins to sever the tie between family income and educational
opportunity.
Extending choice to sectarian institutions raises serious constitutional
questions regarding the proper balance between the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has
developed a jurisprudence, based upon the child benefit theory, that allows us
to resolve the dilemma by distinguishing between direct aid to religious
institutions and aid to individuals who might choose to attend these institu-
tions.457 Contrary to the principle set down by the Burger Court in the second
prong of the Lemon458 test, this new jurisprudence is more directed toward
protecting the religious freedom of individuals than determining whether the
protection of such liberties to the fullest extent might incidentally benefit a
particular religious organization or denomination. This emerging constitutional
jurisprudence does not presuppose a tension between the flourishing of religion
and the general public interest.
At the same time a jurisprudence continues to thrive in many states that
imposes stricter standards of separation than those propounded by the Court,
raising the prospect that religious institutions will be excluded from participa-
tion in choice programs. The prototype of this case now exists in Wiscon-
455. See supra Section III.A. (tracing evolution of equality principle in education).
456. See supra Subsection II.B.2. (describing equal opportunity model of school choice).
457. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills, 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Washington Dep't. of Servs.
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
458. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 668 (1971). The purpose and effect standard was actually
just set down in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). For indications of the
Rehnquist Court's retreat from the Lemon standard, see Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1361
(1984); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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sin,459 but such challenges will become more common as school choice
legislation is enacted in the states. The restrictive policy imposed by some of
the state courts has the potential of creating a constitutional crisis-one that we
can fully comprehend only by intermingling First Amendment with Fourteenth
Amendment reasoning.
According to the Pierce" decision, parents have a right to decide upon
the kind of education given to their children. Like Brown, however, Pierce is
an empty promise if economics is the ultimate factor in determining the kinds
of choices parents have. The choice of a religious-based education should not
only be made available to those who have the means to afford it. Poor parents
who are religious ought to have an opportunity to raise their children in a
religious tradition that is supported by the schools their children attend. Parents
should not be forced to compromise their values fbr fear of losing public
support for a function as essential as education. The freedom to practice
religion as one sees fit ought to be made available to all on an equal basis.
A. The Limits of Liberalism
Disestablishment is one of the most lasting accomplishments of Jeffersonian
liberalism. While it required some time to take full effect, the Bill of Rights
eventually put an end to the intermingling of ecclesiastic power with
government power in colonial America.46' Liberalism, however, reached its
practical and philosophical limit as applied to schooling in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, when the principles it adopted were promoted on the basis
of contradictory and faulty premises. While on the one hand liberalism
employed the public school as a conduit for public values, on the other hand,
it defended the content of its curriculum on the grounds of moral neutrali-
ty.462 It negated the contribution that mediating institutions, especially
religious ones, could make toward developing a civic culture. In the end
liberalism fostered a religious tolerance that protected all but those who were
deeply religious; it tended to dismiss the objections of conscience put forward
by the most unconventional religious groups, leaving vulnerable the very
minorities most deserving of the constitutional protection promised by the Bill
of Rights. 46
459. See Thompson v. Jackson, No. 95-2153-OA, L.C. #s 95CV1982 and 95CV1997 (Wis. Aug.
25, 1995).
460. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
461. See supra Section L.A (regarding early history of religious freedom in America). Incorporation
through the 14th Amendment was a gradual process, see supra Subsection h.A. 1., and was not applied
specifically to the Establishment Clause until the Everson decision. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1 (1947).
462. See supra Subsection Ill.C.1.
463. See supra Subsection Ill.C.2.a.
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If twentieth-century liberalism was grounded on contradictory philosophical
premises, the Court was culpable in perpetuating these theoretical illusions."
To the extent that the Court lent support to religious schools, it did so on the
pretense that one could separate the instructional and sectarian components of
their curricula,4" even though on other occasions it had found the secular
and religious missions of these institutions hopelessly intertwined.4 The
Court swore allegiance to religious freedom and equal educational opportunity,
but at times it created legal obstacles that would virtually deny the poor access
to quality schools because of the schools' religious orientation.4"
While those educators behind the common school movement understood the
power of the classroom in promoting civic virtue, they also exhibited a certain
naivete. They were so entrenched in their own ideological inclinations that they
were incapable of recognizing how their pedagogy was biased against those
who were not believers. Nor could they foresee how schools immersed in the
political process could fall prey to the agenda of powerful interests. In the end
the greatest flaw in the common school ideology was its failure to perceive how
indoctrination according to a government-determined orthodoxy, whether
religious or secular,468 undermined the democratic ethos it had hoped to
engender.
B. The Triumph of Pluralism
Students of democracy as early as Tocqueville,"' and as recent as
Stephen Carter,47 have identified the important role that religious organiza-
tions have played in mediating between government and citizen. By providing
"an independent moral voice," 47' the church, synagogue, or mosque counter-
balances the power of an aggressive state. As Madison explained it, a robust
religious pluralism is a bulwark of the republic and a defense against
tyranny.472 Madison's vision of a thriving pluralism furnishes us with a
464. See Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience orFreedom of Choice?, in RELGIOUS LIBERTY
IN THE SUPREME COURT 483 (rerry Eastland ed., 1993) (describing inadequacy of liberal jurisprudence
in understanding religious forms of behavior).
465. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Board
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
466. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 657 (1971) (finding that religious and secular
missions are "inextricably intertwined"); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977) (noting
"impossibility" of separating two).
467. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Sloan
v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 828 (1973); Essex v. Wolman, 406 U.S. 912 (1972).
468. Under the neutrality principle the Supreme Court has at times specifically ruled against
imposing a "religion of secularism." See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
469. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 435, at 417-18.
470. CARTER, supra note 422, at 33-43.
471. Id. at 36-37.
472. See supra Subsection I.A.2.c.
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political theory that shapes a jurisprudence of religious freedom, one that
integrates the liberty interests of the Free Exercise Clause with the egalitarian
concerns of the Equal Protection Clause. Notwithstanding Employment Division
v. Smith,4 73 this jurisprudence is taking shape in the decisions emergent from
the Rehnquist Court.
One might uncover the foundation fbr this pluralistic approach to the
Constitution in Wlz,474 where Justice Harlan prescribed "an equal protection
mode of analysis"475 and praised religious organizations for their unique
contribution to the "pluralism of American society."" Or we might turn to
the majority opinion in Mueller,477 where then-Justice Rehnquist praised the
Minnesota tax credit which "fairly equalize[d] the tax burden."4 7' Neverthe-
less, there is a greater consistency evident among the decisions of the
Rehnquist Court itself. As one legal scholar analyzes the case law, the Court
has replaced a separationist model of religious freedom with an equality
model .479
Two rules are inherent in the equality model: first, that all religions be
granted equal status by government; secondly, that religion and non-religion
be treated the same. 4' The case pattern supporting this model is evident in
the financial aid decisions of the Rehnquist Court, beginning with Witters,45 1
calling for equal treatment for students attending sectarian institutions. The
pattern is also apparent in the Court's free speech cases beginning with
Mergens,4 2 which applied Fourteenth Amendment reasoning to uphold the
Equal Access Act. The equality rule most recently came into play in
Rosenberger,483 a case involving both free speech and financial aid.
A review of these decisions leads to the conclusion that the Court would
uphold a policy of school choice involving sectarian schools provided that
certain requirements are met: that funds are allocated to the child rather than
the institution, that both public and nonpublic schools are permitted to
473. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See supra notes 137-38. The Smith decision
is understood to have overturned the strict scrutiny standard set by the Court in Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398
(1963), which required any law interfering with a religious practice to satisfy a compelling government
interest. In 1990 Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb
(1994), which restored the compelling interest standard. The constitutionality of this law is being
challenged. See Belgard v. Hawaii, 883 F.Supp. 510 (D. Haw. 1995) (holding RFRA constitutional).
Butsee Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F.Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (deeming RFRA unconstitutional).
474. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
475. Id. at 696.
476. Id. at 689.
477. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
478. Id. at 396.
479. See Esbeck, supra note 5, at 614-22.
480. Id. at 616.
481. Witters v Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986). See generally supra
Subsection I.B.3.a.
482. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). See generally supra Subsection I.B.3.b.
483. Rosenberger v. Rectors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
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participate, and that all religious institutions are treated the same. A school
choice policy that makes public assistance available on the basis of financial
need would provide the poor with an unprecedented opportunity to receive a
quality education and to exercise religious freedom in whatever way they saw
fit. It would promote full equality.
C. The Imperatives of Federalism
In 1987 a group of students in the state of Washington sued in federal court
after their high school refused them permission to form a religious club. They
argued that school officials had violated the Equal Access Act (EAA), as well
as the Free Speech, Free Exercise, Free Association, Equal Protection, and
Due Process Clauses of the Constitution. The district court" and court of
appeals"85 both denied relief on the grounds that the Washington state
constitution bars religious organizations from meeting on school premises. The
Supreme Court, however, vacated the decisionand remanded it for reconsider-
ation in light of Mergens.486 After the district court again failed to provide
relief for a second time,4" the court of appeals overturned its decision."'
Citing the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that the EAA preempts state law.489 Focusing on the
legislative intent behind the EAA, the court did not find it necessary to deal
with the constitutional claims of the plaintiffs. The lesson in federalism to be
drawn from the case, however, is clear. The court noted, "Many states have
establishment clauses that are more restrictive than the federal establishment
clause." 4 It concluded, nevertheless: "State constitutions can be more
protective of individual rights than the federal Constitution .... However,
states cannot abridge rights granted by federal law." 491
One might add: nor may the states abridge rights protected by the federal
Constitution. State practices that exclude sectarian institutions from participa-
tion in school choice programs on the basis of their religious affiliation run
afoul of the standards established by the Supreme Court and impose an unfair
burden on those parents who might be inclined to choose those schools. Such
provisions impose a particularly harsh burden on the free exercise rights of the
poor. When placed under judicial scrutiny, they should be struck down.
484. See Gamett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 675 F. Supp. 1268 (V.D. Wash. 1987).
485. See Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 865 F.2d 1121, modified, 874 F.2d 608 (9th Cir.
1989).
486. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
487. See Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 772 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
488. See Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 987 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1993).
489. Id.
490. Id. at 646.
491. Id.
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D. Summary
Public education plays an essential role in American society in promoting
a set of core values that perpetuate our system of democracy. Nevertheless,
history demonstrates that at times the public schools have been controlled by
leaders who are either indifferent, insensitive, or inhospitable to certain
religious minorities. School administrators of this sort, who act in the name of
government, are the very ones from whom we need a constitutional shield if
we are to exist as a free people. The same system of public schooling, which
at times has betrayed an ugly religious or anti-religious bias, has failed
generations of poor and minority children who have come to it in pursuit of a
decent education.
In the final analysis, the resolution of the choice issue in education must be
informed by an appreciation of what constitutionalism means within a free
society. Our Constitution, and especially its Bill of Rights, was written to
protect individuals from excessive governmental power. These protections,
originally designed with the federal government in mind, were eventually
applied to the states by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment. The
First Amendment was crafted to ensure that the religious rights of individuals
would not be compromised by public authority. The Establishment Clause
serves that purpose only to the extent that it advances the free exercise rights
of individuals; when disestablishment is invoked to burden free exercise rights,
it undermines the very Constitution of which it is a part. While our federalism
permits the states to define rights more broadly than analogous constitutional
rights, it cannot tolerate the abridgement of those rights by the states.
By allowing government to provide financial aid to parents whose children
attend sectarian schools, the Court has discovered a way to accommodate
individual religious freedom without violating the disestablishment precepts of
the First Amendment. In this sense, school choice is a celebration of our
constitutionalism: allowing religious minorities to educate their children in
accordance with the principles of their faith without fbregoing the benefit of a
free education; making such alternatives available to all, regardless of
economic considerations; providing poor children with access to private
institutions when public schools are unable to accommodate their educational
needs; integrating our commitment to religious freedom with our aspiration fbr
educational opportunity; and, in the end, promoting both religious and
educational equality for all people.
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